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Clare Bullock Boyd 
“Ultra-High Risk”: Exploring 
the Prodrome to Psychosis 
through Cognitive and 
Dialogic Theoretical Lenses 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study is a theoretical exploration of the clinical phenomenon known as the 
prodrome to schizophrenia. The prodrome refers to a constellation of clinical symptoms 
that signal considerably high risk for the development of psychosis and/or schizophrenia. 
The prodrome is an area of high research interest, as the potential for early intervention 
with prodromal individuals to prevent or delay the onset of psychosis appears to be 
possible.  
The clinical phenomena of the prodrome were explored, including a 
comprehensive review of the relevant literature and research. Case material is also 
presented. The prodrome is then conceptualized with a cognitive theoretical framework, 
including a discussion of research interventions using a cognitive or cognitive-behavioral 
approach and application to the case material with a cognitive theoretical perspective. 
The core cognitive components of cognitive distortions, automatic thoughts and core 
beliefs were examined and applied to the prodrome.  
Next, the prodrome was explored using a postmodern approach, specifically 
utilizing a dialogic theoretical framework. A discussion of the Open Dialogue approach 
was applied to the prodrome and to the case material. The core postmodern and dialogical 
concepts of dialogical process, loss of agency/voice and sense of self were applied to the 
prodromal phenomena.  
  
The two theoretical conceptualizations were then explored more in depth, 
including a discussion of the commonalities and divergences between the theories. I then 
used the core components of the two theories to formulate a synthesis in order to 
illuminate the prodrome in a new way. My findings from this process were indicative 
that, from both theoretical points of view, one of the defining features of the prodrome is 
a person’s altered sense of self, which leads to a diminished self-experience. The 
prevalence of negative symptoms, apparent cognitive decline, “soft” or attenuated 
hallucinations and delusional beliefs and role or functional decline during the prodromal 
phase are often the result of an externalizing bias and core vulnerabilities based on a 
person’s experience of the self as diminished.  The thesis concludes with clinical practice 
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Schizophrenia and other disorders that include psychosis as the defining feature of 
the illness have long eluded comprehensive theoretical conceptualization.  Many theories 
toward an etiology of the heterogeneous symptomatology encompassing schizophrenia 
have been proposed and researched. For many decades, there has existed a tension 
between the biological model and models that emphasize the significance of 
environmental and psychosocial stressors in the pathology of psychosis.  While 
researchers, clinicians and academics cannot agree on the causation of psychosis, they 
certainly can agree on one thing: that psychotic disorders are ubiquitously debilitating 
and cause enormous suffering for patients and their families, as well as society at large. 
Research of late has focused predominantly on clinical trials for antipsychotic medication 
and its role in symptom abatement and management. With this suffering as motivation 
and a growing body of evidence in diagnostic accuracy and psychopharmacological 
efficacy, further research has delved into attempting to understand the phase or period 
preceding full-blown frank psychosis. This phase, period or constellation of symptoms 
has come to be known as the prodrome to schizophrenia. The prodrome refers to a set of 
risk factors that point to the potential onset of schizophrenia or psychotic disorders. This 
study will explore the phenomena of the prodrome and then will use two different 
theoretical frameworks to conceptualize this clinical entity.   
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 While research in the area of understanding and identifying the prodrome with 
certainty has gained much interest over the last few decades, definitive knowledge of the 
nature of the prodrome does not yet exist. Intervening clinically with patients meeting the 
criteria for frank psychosis or schizophrenia has long been moving toward a bio-medical 
and neuro-developmental conceptualization, but the etiology of the full blown illness 
remains fundamentally elusive, further complicating attempts to understand the earliest 
manifestations of the illness.  The DSM-III-R (American Psychological Association 
[APA], 1987) included nine symptoms of the putative prodrome; however, this category 
was eliminated from the DSM-IV-R (APA, 1994). As categorization and diagnostic 
certainty remain debatable among researchers, many clinicians see patients with sub-
clinical manifestations of psychotic symptoms in a variety of settings. Schizophrenia is 
generally understood to be a highly debilitating chronic course of illness that exacts an 
enormous social cost on families, as well as long-term burdens on mental health delivery 
systems (Lavretsky, 2008). Therefore, prevention and early intervention are areas of high 
interest.  
 The predominant paradigm for conceptualizing schizophrenia has been the 
biomedical framework, which is represented by biological psychiatry and more 
specifically by the psychopharmological treatment of illnesses and clinical presentations 
classified as psychiatric disorders. This paradigm has become so prevalent in explaining 
the causes, conceptualizations and treatments for schizophrenia that psychosocial or 
environmental influences are most often considered secondary. The stress-diathesis 
model or stress-vulnerability model contends that a genetic, biological, or neurological 
marker predisposes an individual to developing schizophrenia, with environmental, 
 2
psychological, social, or developmental influences offering contributory impact to the 
onset of first the first episode of psychosis (Ellman & Cannon, 2008), as well as to the 
attenuated symptoms often observed in the prodromal state.  
  The primary preferred treatment for frank psychosis and for schizophrenia at this 
time is antipsychotic medication (Torrey, 1995). One of the first treatments considered 
successful in treating schizophrenia was chlorpromazine (Downar & Kapur, 2008). This 
and other major tranquilizers were used broadly during the 1950s, particularly in 
institutionalized patients with a schizophrenia diagnosis (Lavretsky, 2008). First 
generation, or typical, antipsychotics, also known as neuroleptic drugs, are generally 
believed to work on the positive symptoms of schizophrenia. Second generation, or 
atypical antipsychotics, work on negative symptoms, as well as positive symptoms 
(Downar & Kapur, 2008). Both clinicians and laypeople alike seem to be in agreement 
that schizophrenia is the result of a hereditary biochemical or neurological disorder that 
results in disordered thinking, perceptual and sensory abnormalities, social withdrawal 
and other depression-like symptoms (Torrey, 1995). Along with medication, psychosocial 
treatment modalities have and continue to include social skills training, cognitive 
behavioral therapy, clinical case management and supportive counseling (Downar & 
Kapur, 2008; Torrey, 1995). Therefore, it can be stated that the overarching paradigm for 
understanding psychotic illness, while dominated by a biomedical and 
neurodevelopmental conceptualization, also includes a strong psychosocial understanding 
of the clinical presentation of psychotic disorders. For example, it is commonly 
understood that psychosocial stressors like homelessness or social isolation can lead to 
the exacerbation of psychotic symptoms (Bebbington & Kuipers, 2008). Further, the 
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content of positive symptoms like delusions and hallucinations often include aspects of 
the individual’s social network, family history and current circumstance.  Thus, the 
dominant paradigm in which we find most understanding of psychosis, schizophrenia and 
the prodrome to psychosis is located firmly within the biopsychosocial model.  
 Expanding the understanding of schizophrenia to include psychological and social 
factors has led to less restrictive interventions, such as wraparound social supports in the 
community, rather than institutionalization or long-term hospitalization. However, it 
remains that intensive reliance on a biomedical understanding of the etiology of 
psychosis has led to very high rates of psychiatric medication prescription (Seikkula, 
2002). Further, psychosocial theories have been seen as secondary, primarily as 
contributing to or triggering a pre-existent underlying genetic or other biological 
proclivity to a specific illness. This model parallels the stress-vulnerability model of risk 
for other medical illnesses, such as heart disease or diabetes, where environmental or 
psychosocial factors (e.g. diet or stress) are seen as bringing out an already present 
propensity for the full-blown disease. In such a model, the prodrome to schizophrenia can 
be understood as a constellation of factors that signal high risk for developing psychosis 
or schizophrenia. In the phenomenon chapter, I will provide a thorough concept of the 
current understanding of the prodrome. In this thesis I aim to examine the clinical 
phenomena that are known as the prodrome from both a modernist and postmodernist 
perspective. I then aim to take these two theoretical perspectives and draw significant 
elements of both to establish an understanding of what is happening during the prodrome. 
The topic of this thesis is of significance to clinical social work as it explores the earliest 
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manifestations of one of the most debilitating clinical presentations that social workers 
interface with, namely non-affective psychotic illnesses.  
 This thesis consists of six chapters. The first chapter serves to introduce the 
purpose of the study, the phenomenon to be explored and the relevance to clinical social 
work. The second chapter details the phenomenon of the prodrome, including a review of 
current relevant literature and research outlining the prodrome. The phenomenon chapter 
will include case material in order to orient the reader to the clinical presentation of the 
prodrome. The case of James is provided as a way of grounding the phenomena in 
practical and applicable ways. In the fourth chapter, I will discuss cognitive theory within 
the context of a biopsychosocial framework, including a review of the literature. In the 
first theory chapter, cognitive theory and cognitive-behavioral treatments will be 
explored. Cognitive-behavioral interventions have been studied more than any other 
psychological interventions in the treatment of first episode psychosis, full-blown 
schizophrenia and the prodrome. Several studies have indicated the use of CBT with the 
clinically high-risk population demonstrating attenuated psychotic symptoms. I will then 
use cognitive theory to conceptualize the case material from the second chapter.  In the 
fifth chapter, I will discuss dialogic theory within the broader context of postmodern 
theory, including relevant research and literature. Dialogic theory is represented in this 
thesis by the Open Dialogue Approach, which is a clinical approach to psychiatric crisis 
that has gained widespread use and success in Northern Finland. I will use dialogism and 
the Open Dialogue approach to conceptualize the case material. In the final chapter, I will 
discuss cognitive theory and dialogic theory to explore the prodrome to psychotic illness.  
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In this chapter, I will outline the theoretical framework for the subsequent 
chapters. I will also be developing and describing the analytical framework that will be 
used in the discussion chapter. As previously said, this paper will explore the concept of 
the prodrome of schizophrenia. The definition of the prodrome is as elusive as the clinical 
entity; researchers have, however, refined definitions that appear to be valid and reliable 
in prospective studies.  Nonetheless, the period leading up to full-blown psychotic illness 
remains mysterious in many ways. Many theoretical lenses have been applied to the 
processes, symptoms and experiences that are known as schizophrenia or psychosis. This 
study will attempt to expand the current research literature base by extrapolating existent 
theory to the prodrome. This thesis will utilize current theoretical understandings of 
schizophrenia to investigate the applicability of such theories to the prodrome. The two 
theories that will be used are cognitive theory and dialogic theory. Each theory will be 
applied to the phenomena of the prodrome as well as to case material. Cognitive theory’s 
application is understood in Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, while dialogism’s is best 
represented in the Open Dialogue Approach.  
 It is important to compare the fundamental principles of each theory in order to 
understand what assumptions underlie the two theories. One way to access the 
fundamental principles of a theory related to human experience is to investigate the 
theory’s assumptions of human nature and how individuals’ experience their sense of 
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self. This is to ask, “how does this theory conceptualize self-experience?” I will access 
this question by outlining an individual’s self-experience from the two theoretical 
perspectives and case material. Self-experience is frequently used to match theoretical 
perspectives with subjective experience or practice (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2002). These 
explorations are important to clinical social workers because they underlie our 
foundational understanding of the self, which informs practice and interventions. 
Deviation from healthy manifestations of the self is a presentation of psychopathology 
that often accompanies those suffering from psychosis or the prodrome when seeking 
help from clinicians. Self-experience, a person’s subjective experience of himself or 
herself in the world, is of paramount importance in moving towards understanding the 
phenomena in the prodrome.  In the discussion chapter, I will examine the fundamental 
conceptualization of self-experience in both cognitive theory and dialogism. This will 
then assist in the examination of how humans’ self-experience is impacted during the 
prodrome from each theoretical perspective.  
Biopsychosocial Theory: Cognitive Theory and Cognitive-Behavioral Approach 
 The fundamental conception of self-experience in cognitive theory involves the 
processing of information. In cognitive theory, alterations to adaptive information 
processing are associated with general psychopathology.  It is important to examine the 
different ways that information processing becomes maladaptive during the prodrome 
from a cognitive perspective. These maladaptive processes are exhibited in unhealthy or 
pathological ways of thinking, feeling or behaving.  These psychological symptoms can 
be recognized, managed, corrected, or addressed, according to cognitive theory. 
Maladaptive information processing is acknowledged and corrected during cognitive-
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behavioral therapy. Unhealthy ways of processing internal representations of external and 
internal stimuli are addressed by a therapist with the client. The client then replaces 
maladaptive beliefs and thoughts in order to manage the difficult patterns of feeling and 
behaving associated with the beliefs.  Combating maladaptive beliefs appears to be 
beneficial in redressing the patterns of thought and subsequent distress associated with 
schizophrenia (see Chapter 4 for review of this research). Cognitive theory, as applied in 
cognitive-behavioral interventions, is rooted in a biopsychosocial model that includes the 
possibility that psychotic illness is the result of a confluence of biological, social and 
psychological factors. The cognitive approach focuses primarily on the psychological 
components of the onset in the prodrome, but also explains how these processes impact 
and are impacted by biological and social forces. 
 As will be discussed at length in this paper, the prodrome can be understood as 
the earliest manifestation of psychosis or schizophrenia. From a cognitive theoretical 
basis, the disorder of thought and information processing begins during the prodromal 
phase. This leads to the maladaptive patterns of thinking, feeling and behaving that can 
impact a person’s self-experience. A prodromal individual’s self-experience is 
diminished as the capacity for adaptive and coherent information processing is thwarted. 
Intervening early in this process may offset or possibly prevent conversion to psychosis, 
within a cognitive theoretical frame.  
 After exploring the fundamental principles of self- experience in cognitive theory, 
I will use the following cognitive theoretical components to structure the analysis: core 
beliefs, automatic thoughts and cognitive distortions as they relate to the clinical 
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presentation of the prodrome. The ways that the cognitive behavioral approaches address 
these components during psychosocial interventions will also be discussed.  
Postmodern Theory: Dialogism and the Open Dialogue Approach 
 In postmodern theory and specifically dialogism, the fundamental 
conceptualization of human nature is the notion that each being occupies multiple selves 
or self-positions that are in constant internal dialogue with each other. As Lysacker and 
Lysacker, 2008, aptly describe, “we sense ourselves within and through encounters that 
are at once intra- and interpersonal, and that reflect complementary and dissonant facets 
of our being. [S]elf-positions are axes of self-world interaction, more a matter of who we 
are, than of whom we take ourselves to be” (p. 34). A continuous and ordered series of 
shifts in our multiple self-positions relative to relationships, situations and experiences 
reveals itself to us through the process of intra- and interpersonal dialogue. While this 
process is a complex and dynamic interplay, it remains ordered as a response to worldly 
interactions and coherent internal experience.  The most basic concept of what a human 
being does is to be in constant dialogue with others and within the individual his or 
herself.  
 Self- experience in dialogic theory is emphasized as a coherent self-awareness 
that emerges out of a collection of voices or self-positions (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2002). 
Another foundational principle of humanity in dialogism is that human beings are 
innately relational and therefore must always be in dialogue with others. According to 
dialogism and other social constructivist post-modern theories, meaning is constructed as 
a relational activity (Seikkula & Trimble, 2005). Any utterance that is spoken is in 
response to another being and bears out its meaning as it is responded to.  One of the 
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major components of post-modern thinking regarding schizophrenia is the diminishment 
of the dialogical process, both intra-personally and interpersonally. Subjective self-
experience in the prodrome is marked by incoherence and the collapse or diminishment 
of the self’s experience as dialogical (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2002).  
 This internal intrapersonal dialogue is interrupted and diminished in the prodrome 
to schizophrenia, as well. During the prodromal phase, it is not unusual for the dialogical 
nature of the self to be compromised in many ways.  Firstly, the loss of agency and voice 
plays a major role in a prodromal individual’s capacity to engage in the dialogical 
process. The individual’s sense of self or subjectivity is also compromised during the 
prodromal phase. This frequently leads to withdrawal from interests and social contacts 
that usually have significance for the individual.  
  I will use the concepts of dialogical process, sense of self and loss of 
agency/voice to guide my analysis of the post-modern and dialogic theoretical lens 
applied to the prodrome. I will then explore the specific ways that the Open Dialogue 
approach addresses these concepts.  
Methodology 
 In the discussion, I will compare and contrast the two theoretical perspectives on 
the prodrome, entering this discussion by each theory’s concept of healthy self-
experience.  I will firstly explore the ways the two theories diverge and ways each 
individual theory could be used to critique the other. I will then move into an in depth 
exploration of the ways the two theories can be brought together to help us better 
understand the phenomena of the prodrome. This will be accomplished by examining the 
ways the components of core beliefs, automatic thoughts and cognitive distortions from 
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cognitive theory and dialogical process, sense of self and loss of agency/voice from 
dialogical theory correlate to each other and help to illuminate the prodrome in a new 
way. The synthesized theoretical approach will then be applied to the case of James. I 
will end with offering treatment and clinical practice implications and suggestions, based 
























The following chapter will outline and detail the clinical entity that has come to 
be known as the prodrome of schizophrenia. This particular area of research has gained 
prominence in the last two decades and is now at the forefront of prevention exploration 
for psychotic illness. As Yung and McGorry, pioneers in the research of prodromal 
schizophrenia, have noted in one of their earliest works, in clinical medicine, a prodrome 
refers to the early symptoms and signs of an illness that precede the characteristic 
manifestations of the acute, fully developed illness (1996). As such, the term “prodrome” 
in relation to psychotic illness originated as the concept of the pre-morbid phase of full-
blown schizophrenia or psychosis.  
History of the Prodrome  
Many other diseases, syndromes or disorders have a prodromal phase, during 
which a constellation of symptoms are measureable and lead to the debut of an illness. 
The prodrome is more recently characterized as a set of clinical markers, including sub-
clinical or attenuated symptoms, which are markers or risk factors signifying the phase 
that predates the full blown disease. A simple medical example can be found in the 
measles, where fever, coryzal symptoms, conjunctivitis, and cough signal the phase prior 
to the full-blown disease. These markers are then followed by a very specific rash, 
making definitive diagnosis possible (Yung & McGorry, 1996). Another notable example 
in the medical field, Alzheimer’s disease,  which is known to have a prodromal phase, 
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characterized by Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI) and/or Mild Behavioral Impairment 
(MBI) (Taragano et al., 2009). MCI and MBI are known markers that can be measured 
and assessed as risk factors for dementia, the hallmark of Alzheimer’s disease, much as 
attenuated psychotic symptoms have been the indicators of risk for psychosis, the 
hallmark of schizophrenia. Notably, the word “prodrome” itself has semantic 
connotations indicating that the development of the full-blown disorder is essentially 
inevitable. However, regarding the development of frank psychosis, the term “prodrome” 
is widely and nearly ubiquitously used to generally refer to increased clinical risk for 
psychosis, rather than an identifiable pre-illness phase after which psychosis will indeed 
onset. Efforts to prospectively identify the features of the prodrome to psychosis have 
been variably successful, which will be discussed at length later in this chapter.  
One of the earliest motivations to spark research in the area of prodromal 
schizophrenia was to gain more exacting knowledge of the pathogenesis of psychosis. 
The early research on the prodrome was initiated in the early to mid- 1990’s by several 
groups of researchers across the globe. McGlashan illuminates that increased efficacy of 
antipsychotic medication and an increasing understanding of the etiology and course of 
schizophrenia allowed for a reemphasizing the direction of research towards early 
identification (1996). It was hoped that researching the illness’s earliest detectable signs 
would assist ongoing research in the origination of psychotic disorders. Researchers and 
treating clinicians believed they had advanced dramatically in knowledge of 
schizophrenia as a neuro-biological illness.  More in-depth understanding of its 
pathogenesis was simultaneously a motivation for research on its earliest course, at the 
same time that this more current understanding of schizophrenia also served to make 
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further research into the prodrome possible. The phenomena of psychotic illness at its 
most nascent stage could be more clearly observed and understood in light of a clearer 
vision of chronic psychotic phenomena and diagnostics. Conceptualizing schizophrenia 
as a “brain disorder” of biological, genetic or neurochemical origin enabled researchers to 
search for causes and treatments within a more conventional medical research model. 
Despite advances in pharmacological treatments and promising evidence of genetic and 
biological origins of the illness, treating and working with patients diagnosed with 
schizophrenia, particularly chronic cases, was and remains notoriously difficult. The 
mystery of understanding and treating schizophrenia is summed up by Thomas 
McGlashan (1996), as he states “as a community of mental health providers and 
consumers we celebrate the advances of pharmacotherapy, family psychoeducation, and 
community-based care, but we also see treatment resistance and treatment failure. It is 
resistance and failure that I wish to address” (p. 202).  
Historical Influences on Prodromal Identification 
 
Emil Kraepelin was a German psychiatrist who is credited with formalizing the 
collection of symptoms known now as schizophrenia observed by many doctors, 
particularly in the 19th century. The constellation of symptoms, at that time, was believed 
to be an early form of dementia, leading to the nomenclature dementia praecox, or 
“precocious dementia” (Lavretsky, 2008). The symptoms included catatonia and 
hebrephenia. Kraepelin also recorded the presence of hallucinations in all five senses, but 
auditory hallucinations were prominently noted (Lavretsky, 2008). Kraepelin believed 
that dementia praecox was a disorder with specific neuropatholigcal origin. He also 
differentiated between dementia praecox and manic-depressive illness, the former having 
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a deteriorating course with marked disability in functioning and the latter a cyclical 
pattern or mania and depression.  A Kraepelin characterization of schizophrenic illness 
has been highly influential in the direction of contemporary research, theory and 
psychiatry in the West. The categories that Kraepelin observed and recorded continue to 
guide our own diagnostic and clinical practice. Kraepelin noted in the late 1890s that over 
70% of his patients suffering with dementia praecox had family history of psychosis 
(Lavretsky, 2008).  
Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler first used the term schizophrenia in 1911, which 
quickly replaced dementia praecox. The term literally meant “a mind torn asunder” 
(Lavretsky, 2008).  Bleuler’s conceptualization of schizophrenia included the idea that 
the illness incorporated a broad spectrum of disorders all sharing a psychological 
underpinning. While Bleuler’s work in identifying and naming specific symptoms 
remains in large part intact in our current diagnostic practices, he has also been cited as 
bringing many heterogeneous clinical presentations under the same grouping of 
schizophrenic disorders. This can account for the complex and varied diagnostic 
categories included in most clinical manuals today.  
First Episode Research and Early Identification of Prodromal Phenomena 
Schizophrenia and psychotic disorders in general are known throughout 
psychiatry and by mental health providers to be some of the most difficult, resistant and 
costly illnesses to treat (Corcoran, 2008: Hafner, 2004).  As long-term research on the 
onset, treatment, and diagnosis of schizophrenia was joined with increasing evidence that 
schizophrenia runs in families and appears to responds to medication especially in later 
stages of the illness, many researchers and clinicians attempted to outline the 
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vulnerability markers related to onset of schizophrenic illness (McGlashan, 1996). 
Research on the first episode of psychosis was underway when interest in the prodrome 
intensified, with qualitative and anecdotal retrospective evidence that the decline into the 
first psychotic break was heralded by warning signs that may have been traceable 
(McGlashan, 2001). Research revealed that there was a surprisingly long lag between the 
first psychotic episode and the first presentation for treatment. The period of time 
between first episode of psychosis and seeking of treatment is known and the Duration of 
Untreated Psychosis and is discussed below.  
Hafner and his colleagues, also significant contributors to early understanding of 
prodromal syndromes, conceptualized early detection of the prodrome to psychotic 
illness as “secondary prevention”, as it relies on the detection of subclinical symptoms 
and risk factors later in life (usually adolescence), rather than on prenatal detection 
through genetic testing (2004).  Hafner further postulates that early intervention’s goals 
are to prevent or postpone the onset of psychosis and to interrupt the course of the illness 
after onset, which is generally believed to be a declining course (Castle & Morgan, 2008; 
Lavretsky, 2008; Malla, 2004; McGlashan, 1996). Psychosis can and does frequently 
remit spontaneously with or without treatment. However, many researchers believe that it 
is rare that individuals experiencing psychosis and then remission ever return to their full 
functioning level prior to their first episode (Hafner & an der Heiden, 2008). 
Schizophrenia is generally understood to onset in late adolescence, with some variance, 
including some early onset (earlier in adolescence) and late onset (in adulthood). For the 
purposes of this study, most literature reviewed considered subjects between the ages of 
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13 and 30. Reference to difference in age, gender, race or ethnicity was explored 
minimally by researchers in the literature, but will be noted when relevant.   
Alison Yung and Patrick McGorry, researchers and psychiatrists at the Early 
Psychosis Prevention and Intervention Centre in Melbourne, Australia, established a 
conceptualization of the initial prodrome in psychotic disorders, which has become the 
foundation for ongoing research in the field. Their definition of the initial prodrome in 
psychotic disorders refers to a period of disturbance which represents a deviation from a 
person’s previous experience and behavior, occurring prior to the development of florid 
features of frank psychosis (1996). This is a very broad definition and represents some of 
the earliest understanding in the field of prodromal research.  Yung and McGorry 
believed early on that the prodrome could be thought of as either a pre-psychotic form of 
an emergent psychotic disorder or as a syndrome that signals an increased risk or 
vulnerability to psychosis (1996). The second way of thinking of the prodrome eludes to 
the idea that psychosis is not an inevitable consequence of prodromal indicators. One of 
the challenges of early prodromal research was the necessity of retrospective 
identification of the hallmarks of the prodrome. This began at first with samples of 
patients who had already had a first episode of psychosis retrospectively reporting their 
experiences leading up to their first frank psychotic episode. The first episode marked the 
baseline by which pre-morbid functioning and subsequent symptomology could be 
measured.  
Initial Instruments for Prodromal Assessment 
In Yung and McGorry’s pioneering work on retrospective analysis of prodromal 
features, instruments were designed specifically for interviewing patients about their past 
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prodromal experiences, as no tested measures existed at that time. Dr. Yung designed the 
Multidimensional Assessment of Psychotic Prodrome interview based on literature 
review and her own clinical experience. She further drew on the prodromal checklist 
from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual III-R (1987), which is also discussed later in 
this chapter.  The validity of her measures was not established, but her exploration of 
participants’ retrospective experiences was significant, as these individuals had 
confirmed cases of psychosis at the time of inquiry. Twenty-one patients and/or their 
informants were interviewed regarding the prodromal period before they became floridly 
psychotic. According to this early study, a wide variance in prodromal features was 
discovered. However, sleep disturbance was universal among all participants. Anxiety, 
irritability depressed mood, impaired role functioning, social withdrawal, poor 
concentration, suspicion and lack of motivation were all noted in over two-thirds of the 
individuals. The authors summarize these early findings on the prodrome to include 
attenuated positive symptoms (i.e. perceptual changes, suspiciousness), non-specific 
neurotic and mood-related symptoms and behavioral changes (Yung & McGorry, 1996). 
Of note, many of the participants appeared to show signs of affective illness. Later 
research aimed to explore the phenomena of the prodrome to non-affective psychotic 
illness. Some of the import of the earliest research is found in the narrowing of the 
research populations and criteria, given the high diversity and variability of this and other 
studies’ results.  
Primarily basing features of the prodrome on DSM-III-R prodromal symptoms 
was not a successful diagnostic approach, as it failed to avoid the same high variance and 
broad categorization of “prodromal features,” making narrowing down to actual 
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prospective identification difficult. In fact, the DSM-IV-R eliminated the prodromal 
symptoms checklist from the 1994 edition. However, researchers did not abandon 
attempts to develop prodromal identification measures based on the retrospective work 
begun by Hafner and Yung and McGorry.   
Diagnostic Foundation  
It should be noted that in order to define the prodrome to a disorder, the 
diagnostic criteria for the disorder itself must be examined. Therefore, it is certainly 
important to differentiate between psychosis and full-blown schizophrenia and to 
understand the phenomena of these clinical states in order to fully investigate the 
prodrome to these states.  A thorough and exhaustive exploration of the diagnostic 
categories included in the spectrum of disorders under schizophrenia and psychotic 
illness is far beyond the scope of this study. Further, a critical analysis of current 
diagnostic trends is also not included, despite the fact that diagnostic trends and biases 
greatly influence the population addressed in this study. It is important to keep in mind 
that diagnostic categories and illnesses change over time, as research and social forces are 
applied.  However, it is also important to understand the generally accepted categorically 
clinical manifestations of the entities being discussed. For the purposes of the current 
study, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) series will serve 
as the primary diagnostic tool for defining and categorizing symptomology. The DSM 
III-R states that schizophrenia always includes delusions, hallucinations, or certain 
characteristic disturbances in affect and the form of thought (APA, 1987).  
Diagnostically, psychotic symptoms, or “psychosis,” are said to be the defining feature of 
schizophrenia and other psychotic illnesses.  According to the 1994 edition of the 
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Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), that while psychosis 
may be present in other illnesses or may result from the onset of other disorders, it is 
understood to be a symptom and not the definitive diagnostic feature. For example, 
psychotic symptoms such as hallucinations and delusions may be present in Major 
Depressive Disorder, the major diagnostic differentiation is that major depressive 
symptoms are the prevailing clinical presentation (APA, 1994). Psychosis in the 1994 
manual was most specifically defined as the presence of delusions or hallucinations, 
occurring in the absence of insight into the pathological etiology of these symptoms. 
More broadly, psychotic symptoms could include hallucinations that were recognized as 
such. Other understandings included more positive symptoms of schizophrenia such as 
disorganized speech or impaired behaviorally functioning. Overall, psychosis was 
characterized as the “loss of ego boundaries” or “gross impairment in reality testing,” 
which were earlier conceptualizations also included in the DSM-III. Most editions of the 
manual include some minimal criteria for duration of symptoms.  
More recent criteria for full-blown schizophrenia include both “positive” and 
“negative” symptoms. Generally, positive symptoms are defined as “an excess or 
distortion of normal functions”, while negative symptoms “reflect a diminution or loss of 
normal functions” (APA, 2000). Distortions of thought (delusions), perception 
(hallucinations), language and thought processes (disorganized speech), and impaired 
behavior (disorganized or catatonic) are included in positive symptom categories. 
Negative symptoms include restrictive emotional expression and intensity (affective 
flattening), restricted thought and speech patterns (alogia), restriction of goal-directed 
behavior (avolition) and restriction of experiencing pleasure (anhedonia) (2000).  
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Declining Course of Illness Framework 
Another important piece of groundwork for understanding psychosis that has 
influenced how prodromal research has progressed is the “duration of untreated illness” 
model. The length of time that psychosis is not treated is believed to contribute greatly to 
the course and long-term outcomes of the illness; the longer treatment is postponed after 
the first episode of clinically significant symptoms the more negative the outcomes have 
been noted (Hafner & an der Heiden, 2008). The period between when even slight 
behavioral or functioning changes are first noticed, known as pre-morbid functioning, 
and the first episode of florid or frank psychosis is of special importance, as it appears to 
have implications for long-term recovery and/or relapse. Based on a neuro-developmental 
model of psychosis and schizophrenia, psychosis is understood to be a declining course 
illness that if left untreated would only result in less favorable outcomes. While florid 
positive psychotic symptoms may remit with little or no intervention, rarely do 
individuals retain their previous levels of functioning, particularly in social interaction, 
work and role functioning and affect expression (Addington & Addington, 2008).  Malla 
et al. conducted a study in which they reported that the Duration of Untreated Psychosis 
(DUP) was predictive of less favorable indicator measurements in level of remission, 
positive, negative, depression and anxiety symptoms in short to mid-term patient 
outcomes (at least a year after seeking treatment) (2001). Later studies focused on longer-
term outcomes. Harris et al., researchers located at the University of Melbourne and 
associated with ORYGEN, a specialized early psychosis service facility where the 
original first episode psychosis (EPPIC) and prodromal early intervention treatment 
center, the Personal Assessment and Crisis Evaluation (PACE) clinic, conducted a large 
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scale prospective study of first episode psychosis patients over an eight year period. The 
study revealed that shorter DUP is significantly associated with decreased severity of 
positive symptoms, and enhanced social and occupational functioning and quality of life 
(Harris et al., 2005). This study also indicated that DUP was not associated with negative 
symptoms, which were more likely to be impacted by premorbid adjustment (2005).  
Other long-term studies have corroborated the DUP theory that outcomes in patients tend 
to be less favorable the longer the duration before first psychiatric treatment is sought 
(Bottlender & Moller, 2003). As a body of literature, these studies have been used as 
evidence in support of further investigation into early detection, identification and 
intervention for psychosis and schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, namely to move 
forward in identifying the prodrome prospectively. As Barnaby Nelson and Alison Yung 
summarize from their research and anecdotal experience as clinicians serving patients 
suffering with psychosis, early intervention is crucial as individuals experiencing early 
phases of psychosis or the prodrome may be more like to engage in treatment before 
psychotic symptoms are entrenched, social networks are dissolved or disrupted and 
functioning has deteriorated significantly (2008).  
Narrowing Measures for Identification of the Prodrome 
As secondary prevention, as Hafner described it, became the emphasis of 
prodromal researchers, it was incumbent on researchers to identify the features prodrome 
objectively. In order to develop consistent and reliable measures for identification of this 
clinical state, clinical trials were arranged with the goal of measuring the rate of 
conversion to psychosis among the sample. This population could then be identified and 
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diagnosed as pre-psychotic or at risk for developing psychosis. Ultimately, researchers 
goal was the development of interventions that were justifiable clinically, ethically, and 
economically. As motivation became focused on the potential for preventative treatment 
and early intervention before full blown-psychosis onsets, research quickly shifted 
towards the development and testing of clinical measures that can be used to identify 
patients who are prodromal.  
Vulnerability to psychosis has long been thought to apply to more people than 
ever become fully psychotic, a concept supported in early Kraepelian theory of 
schizophrenia. The belief that psychosis could appear among individuals who were 
already at specific risk and who were exposed to particular acute stressors was long held 
by both doctors and the public in general. This led to the notion that a “nervous 
breakdown” or “psychotic break” was the result of environmental factors conflated with a 
pre-existing capacity for psychosis. Researchers set about attempting to identify what 
placed an individual at risk for such a break.  
Genetic predisposition to schizophrenia was accepted as scientific fact as early as 
the mid-1990s and marked a clear direction in research, since isolating a genotype that 
carried the illness seemed quite possible at that time (McGlashan, 1996). Since then, 
many researchers have searched for a schizophrenic phenotype. Despite this certainty, a 
purely genetic cause of psychotic illness has not been made clear. However, genetic risk 
remains one of the biggest markers for prediction of psychosis as definitive measures for 
identifying the prodrome have tested.  The hereditary, or at least, the familial nature of 
schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders is still considered to be one of the most 
widely accepted theories of causality and prospective risk identification.  
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Other vulnerability markers that were identified through retrospective research 
included brief psychotic symptoms, sub-clinical or attenuated psychotic symptoms and 
decline in role functioning (McGlashan 1996). Some studies also indicated that 
neurocognitive abnormalities and behavioral signs are markers of the prodrome or of 
clinical high-risk states. Subtle neurocognitive deficits may predate the onset of 
attenuated psychotic symptoms (Cornblatt, 2001).   
According to the North American Prodrome Longitudinal Study research teams, 
five features appeared uniquely connected to the prediction of psychosis from baseline 
presentation. Participants were help-seeking prodromal or at-risk individuals. These five 
features were: genetic risk with recent deterioration in functioning, higher levels of 
unusual thought content, higher levels of suspicion/paranoia, greater social impairment 
and a history of substance abuse (Cannon et al., 2008).  Retrospective recording of pre-
morbid presentation of these vulnerability markers were the focus of creation of 
diagnostic measures for the prodrome.  
Regarding specifiable diagnostic categories for the identification of the prodromal 
phase of psychotic disorders, including schizophrenia, only the DSM-III-R is notable for 
including prodromal symptomology. Although this DSM version was completed and 
published in 1987, long before the bulk of prodromal research began in the late 1990s, it 
is indicative of the direction clinical research and retrospective identification of risk 
factors were headed. The DSM-III-R’s broadly defined list of prodromal symptoms are 
marked by a “clear deterioration from a previous level of functioning” and is 
characterized by “social withdrawal, impairment in role functioning, peculiar behavior, 
neglect of personal hygiene and grooming, blunted or inappropriate affect, disturbances 
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in communication, bizarre ideation, unusual perceptual experiences, and lack of initiative, 
interests and energy” (1987). The manual recognizes both the retrospective nature of this 
diagnostic criteria and the variability in length and nature of the prodromal phase.  
Diagnosing the prodrome, therefore, rests heavily on our diagnostic categories, 
criteria and concepts of psychosis and schizophrenic disorders as defined in the most 
current diagnostic manual. The most reliable way to define the prodrome was initially to 
identify it as a retrospective entity relative to conversion to psychosis. In other words, 
individuals who had developed frank psychosis and who themselves could or had 
relatives who assisted in reporting their functioning and clinical issues prior to onset were 
asked to discuss the pre-psychotic phase of their illness. In one such retrospective study, 
researchers interviewed subjects who were in the recovery phase after their acute first 
episode of psychosis. Participants were asked about the period leading up to the 
psychosis, using a combination of unstructured and semi-structured techniques. 
Symptoms identified retrospectively were a varied mixture of attenuated psychotic 
symptoms, neurotic and mood-related symptoms, and behavioral changes. Symptoms 
were often disabling and some, such as suicidal thoughts, potentially life-threatening. 
(Yung & McGorry, 1996).  
Patients who are considered Ultra High Risk (UHR) or potentially prodromal are 
being screened by a number of different measures, all primarily based on the three 
syndromes retrospectively identified by Alison Yung and Patrick McGorry, both based 
out of the ORYGEN Youth Health facility in Melbourne, Australia. Yung and McGorry 
(1996) pioneered three distinct prodromal syndromes that are thought to all potentially 
lead to full-blown psychotic illness. The first syndrome, as well as the most common 
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among prodromal patients, is the Attenuated Positive Symptoms category (APS), which 
accounts for sub-clinical or prodromal, positive symptoms that have begun in the last 
year but have not met the criteria for severity. The second syndrome is Brief Intermittent 
Psychotic Symptoms (BIPS) syndrome, which involves the presence of recent-onset, 
psychotic-level syptoms that occur for less than one week and spontaneously remit.  
Lastly, the third syndrome identified by Yung and McGorry’s research is the Genetic 
Risk and Deterioration (GRD) category, which is determined if the patient has 
schizotypal personality disorder or a first degree relative with a psychotic disorder, in 
addition to a 30 % decline in functioning over the last month. It is possible for patients to 
be categorized in two different syndromes. Based on the above three syndromes, it is 
clear that biological, psychological and social forces are currently understood to impact 
the onset of putative psychosis.  Meeting the criteria for the prodrome is a diagnosis that 
describes individuals who are at “ultra-high” clinical risk for developing psychosis. 
  The PACE clinic (Personal Assessment and Crisis Evaluation) in Melbourne, 
Australia was one of the first sites devoted to the assessment, diagnosis and treatment of 
the prodrome. The researchers located at this clinic in Melbourne established the reliable 
measure, the Comprehensive Assessment of At Risk Mental States (CAARMS), which is 
a semi-structured interview designed to identify and assess the UHR criteria in 
individuals presenting with potentially prodromal symptoms (Yung, 2005). The 
CAARMS is generally used in European and Australian studies and clinics. The 
Comprehensive Assessment of At-Risk Mental States (CAARMS) measure includes 
recent onset of functional decline, genetic risk, and attenuated (subclinical) or brief 
threshold psychosis (Bota, 2008; Yung, 2008). The CAARMS were used in several 
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studies to assess three separate trait groups of at-risk individuals. The first group includes 
Attenuated (sub-threshold) Psychotic Symptoms (APS). This group experiences 
symptoms of thought disorder, particularly the presence of hallucinations or delusional 
beliefs that do not meet the full criteria for psychosis in either severity or conviction 
(Yung, 2005; Yung et al., 2008). For example, a threshold level delusion might be that an 
individual believed that the U.S. government had launched a satellite with the specific 
intent of following that individual’s whereabouts and tracking their thoughts. In contrast, 
a sub-threshold level of this delusion might be that a government satellite was indeed 
launched and the individual worried with regularity that the satellite perhaps was being 
used to track him. In the sub-threshold case, the individual was still able to identify the 
feelings and thoughts as his own cognitions that he could believe or not. The difference in 
the two levels in this case is in the conviction of the belief and its origin. The second trait 
group identifiable through the CAARMS is the Brief Limited Intermittent Psychotic 
Symptoms group (BLIPS). The BLIPS group includes individuals whose symptoms 
spontaneously remit within twelve months. The third group assessed with the CAARMS 
is the presumed genetic vulnerability group. This group is also assessed using another 
measure- the Family Interview for Genetic Studies (FIGS)- and includes a family history 
of psychotic disorder in a first degree relative or a diagnosis of Schizotypal Personality 
Disorder in the at-risk individual (Yung et al., 2008).  
The above definition of the three syndromes of the prodrome has also been 
operationalized by McGlashan et al. at the PRIME Clinic at Yale’s Department of 
Psychiatry in the SIPS/SOPS measure. The SIPS/SOPS is currently the leading measure 
used in North American Studies and clinics. The Structured Interview for Prodromal 
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Symptoms (SIPS) measure includes assessment of onset or worsening of subclinical 
positive symptoms in five categories, including unusual thought content, 
suspicion/paranoia, perceptual anomalies, grandiosity, and disorganized communication 
and was found to be a valid measure (Miller et al., 2003), with a conversion rate of 50% 
(7 of the 14 of individuals identified as prodromal using SIPS were psychotic at after 
twelve months). This is in comparison to other studies where conversion to psychosis has 
been predicted with varying success. Further, the above study also examined the 
interrater reliability of administering the SIPS/SOPS interviews. The measures were 
shown to have excellent inter-rater reliability, meaning that once trained in assessment 
using the SIPS/SOPS, clinicians were nearly always in agreement in diagnosing the 
prodrome (Miller et al., 2003). 
 Generally, in combined studies of the predictive power of assessment measures, 
the SIPS and CAARMS have been recorded as identifying patients who will convert to 
psychosis at rates between 40%-60% (Bota, 2008; Yung et al., 2003).  
Between 2000 and 2003, the National Institute for Mental Health (NIMH) funded 
a multisite collaborative study called “Prevention and Early Intervention in Psychotic 
Disorders,” which focused on refining prodromal diagnostic criteria and improving the 
predictive power of these measures.  This North American Prodrome Longitudinal Study 
(NAPLS) involved collaboration by eight individual research sites. The SIPS/SOPS 
criteria were universally used in assessing whether participants met prodromal criteria. 
Once diagnosed as prodromal in relation to one of the three prodromal syndromes, 
participants were followed for two and a half years. The results were a 35.3% conversion 
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rate, meaning that about 35 % of participants identified on the basis of recent onset or 
worsening of subsyndromal psychotic symptoms experienced conversion to psychosis 
after two and a half year follow-up (Cannon et al., 2008). The NAPLS data set was more 
broadly used to establish a common set of diagnostic characteristics for examining the 
prodrome, namely the SIPS approach, when applied to help-seeking individuals, those at 
genetic/familial risk and a normal comparison group (Addington, 2007).  
In order to successfully create the above measures, it was necessary to recruit 
potentially prodromal individuals, assess them using the most current version of the 
instrument in question, follow the individual for a period of time and then reassess the 
individual to see if they have indeed converted to psychosis, as meeting prodromal 
criteria might suggest. A wide variance in the conversion prediction rates is noted, as 
discussed above. Further, the nature of the sample and recruitment strategies should 
briefly be reflected upon, as it is helpful in understanding the nature of early intervention 
in psychosis. Firstly, most studies in the literature enlist individuals who are help-seeking 
and screened for psychosis risk indicators, so many of the conversion rates can not be 
applied to general population samples as a way of screening for psychosis risk (Cannon et 
al., 2008). Another consideration is the possibility of “false-positive” diagnosis, which is 
certainly of concern if treatment interventions are to be explored.  
CASE MATERIAL 
The following case is drawn from the casework of Dr. Cheryl Corcoran, who is a 
psychiatrist and researcher of note in the field of prodromal schizophrenia identification 
and treatment (Corcoran, 2009).  The case is a good illustration of how complex 
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diagnosing the prodrome can be, particularly regarding differential diagnosis, cultural 
relevance and theoretical framework. 
Identifying Information 
 
 James is a 15-year-old adolescent boy who was referred for social withdrawal, 
declining school function, some depressive symptoms and school refusal. He lives with 




 “I don’t know why my school wanted me to come here today.” 
 
History of Present Illness 
 
 James has always been somewhat shy and awkward, although he has had some 
close friends and has maintained an A-B average in school until recently. His mother, 
who accompanied him to the initial interview, reports that during his recent summer 
vacation, he spent a few weeks in July visiting extended family in South Carolina, where 
he spent time with his cousins, hanging out and playing basketball. When he returned 
home to New York City, his local friends called to invite him to go to the movies, to play 
basketball, etc. He usually declined, saying it was too hot to go outside. Instead, James 
stayed in his room for up to ten hours at a time, watching cartoon channel episodes and 
playing multiplayer online games. Rather than joining his family for dinner, he would 
take food up to his room and eat alone. James began to stay up all night and sleep during 
the day. His room became increasingly messy, he changed his clothes less often and 
showered every other day, only after his began nagging him to do so. For his birthday, his 
mother offered to take him to his favorite restaurant, but he was resistant to do this. She 
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coaxed him to go and he reluctantly agreed. In the car on the way to dinner, he slumped 
in the backseat, covering his face with his hand. At the restaurant, he kept his menu 
throughout the meal, hiding his face by holding it upright. He ate all of the shrimp in his 
favorite dish, but without his usual delight.  
 With the start of the new school year, James’ mother was optimistic that he would 
improve. In the first few weeks of September, he went to school daily and did most of his 
homework. When he returned home from school he went straight to his room, where he 
remained on his computer for hours. His room was still quite messy and he showered and 
changed clothes only with repeated prodding.  
 
 By October, he had become somewhat irritable, especially with a younger niece 
who wanted to spend more time with him. His clear preference was to be alone. His 
friends had stopped calling him. His mother said it was like he had become a stranger, 
unlike himself, and she worried he might be using drugs or if this was just adolescence. 
His first report card revealed almost all C’s. His teachers reported he was very quiet in 
class, typically looking out the window or doodling and drawing. His English teacher saw 
his drawings and reported they were full of nihilistic themes, including images of 
explosions and violence. Although James could generally complete other types of 
assignments, he had particular difficulty with writing assignments. He would write a first 
sentence and then stop, saying he was not sure what else to add.  At school, the janitor 
found him sitting alone in the bathroom after hours; James could not or would not say 
why he was there.  
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 By December, James refused to go to school, and again would not say why. 
Resorting to desperate measures, his mother locked him out of the apartment during the 
day so that he would go to school. When she returned from work, she found him just 
sitting quietly on the porch of their home. At the school’s urging, James’ mother brought 
him in for a psychiatric evaluation.  
 
Past Psychiatric History 
 





 James was the product of a full-term, normal vaginal delivery. He had mild 
asthma as a young boy, for which he was prescribed albuterol inhalers. He has not 





 As an infant and toddler, James was a much easier baby than his brother, who had 
been colicky. His mother reports that when she took him shopping, he would sit in the 
cart quietly. James began walking at 14 months. His mother thinks he may have started 
speaking a little later than his brother, but she is not sure. James responded well to 
cuddling and played with other children. He has always been a little clumsy and less 
athletic and outgoing than his brother.  
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 When James went to preschool and then kindergarten, he separated easily from 
his mother, but his teachers noted he was a little shy and needed to be drawn out. He 
rarely initiated play with other children but joined in when invited. His mother describes 
him as being more compliant and less mischievous than his brother.  
James was referred for evaluation in the second grade for inattention without 
hyperactivity. The reports were lost, but his mother recalls that James was prescribed a 
stimulant of unknown dose for a brief period, which was not particularly helpful. Of note, 
James was taller than the other boys in his class- “like a gentle giant”- and other children 
provoked and teased him to see if he would respond. His teachers all liked him 
immensely and tried to protect him, as they perceived him to be somewhat vulnerable.  
 James’ school performance over several years was marked by A’s and B’s, 





 James lives in a one-bedroom apartment in northern Manhattan with his mother 
and older brother, with whom he shares a bedroom.  James has never known his father. 
When was age 3, he was in foster care for a few months with his brother when his mother 
was hospitalized (see below). He has no history of abuse or neglect.  The family is 




 James’ mother was hospitalized 25 years ago for an episode of psychosis, which 
has never recurred. James’ mother said that she thought she was hearing the voice of an 
older uncle, named Jimmy Carter, who had recently died. She said the doctors mistakenly 
thought she was having auditory hallucinations of the U.S. president. She was given 
chlorpromazine briefly and discharged within a few weeks. The symptoms have not 
recurred, and she has not taken any additional psychiatric medications or received any 
care since the hospitalization.  
 
Mental Status Examination 
 
 James appeared younger than his stated age ad was quite slender.  He wore age-
appropriate clothing, including a basketball jersey and jeans, and a baseball hat on 
backwards. He appeared awkward and shy and sat quietly while his mother described the 
course of events leading up to the evaluation.  
 When interviewed alone, James was compliant with the interview, answering all 
questions. He maintained fair eye contact and spoke softly, smiling occasionally while 
tapping his foot. He described his mood as “OK”. His thought pattern was a bit tangential 
and at times odd.  
 When asked about the past few months, James acknowledged that he did prefer to 
be by himself. He felt uncomfortable around others. He was not sure how to act with his 
friends and he did not think they liked him much anymore. In crowds, he felt like people 
looked at him and thought he was weird or menacing, especially as a young, tall black 
male. He was not sure whether he should make eye contact with others. His 
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neighborhood felt increasingly dangerous, and he felt like he had to look over his 
shoulder. On the other hand, he did not feel like anyone had singled him out or was 
plotting against him in any way.  
 James also reported that he had been thinking a lot about politics, and he thought 
U.S. society as a whole was controlled by television and mass marketing. He thought 
George Bush was a “jerk” and wondered if George Bush had something to do with the 
9/11 attacks so he could get a lot of power. James acknowledged a lot of fantasizing 
about blowing up the world- building a tube to the center of the earth and dropping a 
nuclear bomb- so that all the mistakes and problems would be erased. On the other hand, 
James has considered that a better approach would be to become a rap star and spread the 
message of God and love and peace instead.  
 James also described having feelings of déjà vu every few months, and also 
wondering if he had dreamed about things before they happened, such as a teacher’s 
being absent from school. He also felt sometimes that if he saw a white car drive by, 
something bad might happen. He though these were strange ideas that did not make much 
sense, and he was not sure why he thought them. He confirmed that his thoughts were 
clearly his own and he did not feel controlled by anyone or anything else.  
 When asked about sensory perceptions, James acknowledged that when he 
returned to New York City from South Carolina in the summer, the city seemed much 
louder and smellier and dirtier than before. Therefore, he preferred to stay in the 
apartment. Sometimes, he thought he heard his name in the wind. Late at night, when he 
was in his bedroom, he sometimes thought he saw a black object moving briefly in the 
periphery of his vision. However, he denied any voices or any other type of hallucination.  
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 As this case material demonstrates, diagnostic work on the prodrome is complex 
and requires in-depth exploration of clinical phenomena. Many different theoretical 
frameworks could be applied to this case in order to understand the patient and his 
experience. The implications for treatment are also riddled with complexity. For instance, 
if James was not actually at risk for developing psychosis, yet he and his mother were 
informed that this was a possibility, it may have deleterious effects because of increased 
stigma and shame associated with serious mental illness. Treatment with psychotropic 
medication in a false positive case is certainly an ethical concern, as the side effects of 
both conventional neuroleptics and atypical antipsychotics are serious and must be 


















 In this chapter I will first outline the broad biopsychosocial framework before 
introducing cognitive theory and the closely related approach of cognitive-behavioral 
therapy. I will then use this lens to examine the case of James once again.  
The Primacy of the Medical Model of Psychiatry 
Schizophrenia is a disorder for which myriad theories have been developed. As a 
spectrum of illnesses, it is remarkably complex and not well understood, despite intensive 
investment in formulating research to discern its etiology. Traditionally, there has been 
tension between biological and environmental causal understandings of psychosis and 
schizophrenia. Medical psychiatry has dominated the field in treatment and research for 
the last several decades, thereby also dominating the narrative of the disorder’s origin. By 
holding the claim that schizophrenia and psychosis have purely biological roots, broad 
implications follow for understanding and treating the prodrome of the illness.  
Conceiving schizophrenia as a “brain disease” over which the sufferer has little or no 
control has come to be the predominant framework of schizophrenia that psychiatrists, 
families, clinicians, patients and the general public understand.  Thus, the prodrome has 
been highlighted recently, as it appears to give clinicians the opportunity to interrupt the 
natural biological course of psychosis with a more advanced knowledge of schizophrenia 
and its onset and treatment. In fact, the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI) has 
adopted the “brain disease” narrative as a way of supporting families, patients and the 
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public in their understanding of this complicated and confusing group of illnesses 
(Torrey, 1995). The biological “brain disease” theory of schizophrenia has been widely 
publicized and lauded by psychiatrists. As E. Fuller Torrey (1995) writes in his seminal 
work, Surviving Schizophrenia, read broadly by families and professionals, states, “there 
is no evidence whatsoever that schizophrenia is caused by how people have been treated 
either as children or as adults; it is a biological disease of the brain, unrelated to 
interpersonal events of childhood or adulthood” (p. 142).  
It is from this backdrop that I approach our first theoretical perspective on the 
prodrome. The biological disease model for psychotic illness has many limits, despite its 
primacy as the dominant narrative in the popular and clinical understandings of 
psychosis. The biological model has been broadened by many researchers and clinicians 
in order to incorporate the complexity of clinical presentation of psychotic illness and 
subsequently, the prodrome. In this chapter, I will lay out the broad framework of the 
biopsychosocial model of schizophrenia. I will then move into an in-depth exploration of 
cognitive theory and its correlate, cognitive-behavioral theory. These theories will be 
discussed and then will be used to frame an understanding of schizophrenia and psychotic 
disorders in general. Cognitive theory and its close relative, cognitive-behavioral theory, 
will then be used to examine and broaden our understanding of the prodrome to 
schizophrenia.  Research and literature related to the theory’s application to both 
psychotic illness and the prodrome will be reviewed. Lastly, the case of James will be 





Biological explanations for schizophrenic illness have more recently been 
adjusted to account for the lack of specificity in narrowing in on any one biological 
theory. For instance, researchers have spent many years attempting to isolate a gene or to 
identify a specific neurotransmitter that can explain the symptoms and etiology of 
schizophrenia. Further, the notion that “stress”, psychological, social and other types, 
does in fact preempt most relapses of psychosis, as well as first episodes of psychosis is 
more widely accepted currently. Environmental influences on this spectrum of 
presentations have been noted in many studies. For instance, schizophrenia has a higher 
incidence in urban areas (Castle & Morgan, 2008). It has also been evidenced that dark-
skinned emigrants who immigrate to areas where the population is primarily light-
skinned have a higher rate of developing schizophrenia (Shean, 2004).  This evidence has 
lead many researchers to expand the knowledge base regarding the cause and onset of 
psychotic illness to include risk factors beyond genetic vulnerability. Therefore, it has 
now become quite commonplace for clinicians, psychiatrists and researchers alike to call 
upon a biopsychosocial model in understanding the etiology and development of 
schizophrenia and more specifically the prodrome to schizophrenia. This chapter will 
outline the relevant biological, psychological and social theoretical models of psychotic 
illness and its prodrome, in order to orient the reader to the broader context of the 
cognitive theoretical approach.  This chapter will then explore in depth one specific 
theoretical model from within the broader biospsychosocial context, specifically the 
cognitive-behavioral approach, which originates in cognitive theory, as it applies to 
prodromal schizophrenia.  
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Most research aimed at understanding psychotic illness, its cause, onset and 
outcomes emanates from the fundamental acceptance of the biopsychosocial model of 
schizophrenic illness. By accepting this theoretical orientation, research conclusions 
accept many assumptions about the nature of the phenomena being researched. Many of 
these factors will be discussed below. However, I find it important to make the reader 
aware of these theoretical assumptions and how they overlay the following factors of the 
biopsychosocial model and cognitive theory. First, it is assumed that schizophrenia is a 
clinical entity with psychosis its core clinical manifestation. There has been research 
suggesting the notion that schizophrenia is spectrum of illnesses or not a clear diagnostic 
category as it is laid out in diagnostic manuals. The research reviewed below, particularly 
regarding the diagnosis of schizophrenia, assumes that the diagnostic criteria in the DSM 
IV-R are correct. These underlying assumptions greatly influence the way prodromal 
research is conducted. Identification is based on current diagnostic categories and a 
biospychosocial model of disease.  
Genetic Factors 
  It is generally accepted that schizophrenia runs in families. For many years, 
geneticists insisted that a gene could be identified that carried the heritable pathology for 
schizophrenia. However, endeavors to narrow to this gene have been unsuccessful and it 
is now more generally accepted that many genes have the capacity to carry the latent 
illness, but such genetic predisposition plays only a small part in the actually advent of 
the disease (Beck et al., 2009; Glatt, 2008). Genetic factors may be considered necessary, 
sufficient or contributing to risk for schizophrenia spectrum disorders (Shean, 2004).  
There are some researchers who insist that genetic factors are primary in the causation of 
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schizophrenia. However, this has not been substantiated in the research and most cases of 
schizophrenia disorders are considered to have other contributing environmental factors 
that “trigger” any underlying genetic vulnerability (Glatt, 2008).  
Gene studies, including twin studies and adoption studies, have helped to confirm 
that there is a higher occurrence of schizophrenia in those with relatives with this 
diagnosis. In fact, having a first-degree relative with the illness does increase the rate of 
schizophrenia prevalence by a factor of at least 10 (from 1% to 9-13%) (Gottesman & 
Erlenmeyer-Kimling, 2001). Generally speaking, the closer in degree relation an 
individual is to a relative with schizophrenia, the higher that individual’s risk for 
developing the disorder (Glatt, 2008). 
As discussed in the last chapter, identifying the prodrome to psychosis has been 
most easily predicted when genetic risk is considered among other assessment tools. 
Thus, it is clear that the role of a familial or heritable condition plays a significant role in 
the earliest notable expressions of psychotic illness. Those at highest risk have a first-
degree relative with psychotic illness as well as recent deterioration in functioning, 
comprising the prodromal syndrome group of Genetic Risk plus Deterioration (GRD; 
Miller et al., 2003).  
Neurodevelopmental Factors 
Schizophrenia has, of late, been broadly understood to be a neurodevelopmental 
disorder. This view of the illness purports that schizophrenia or psychotic illness is the 
result of the confluence of a basic biological error (likely prenatal injury or illness) and 
genetic influence or risk, all of which combine to create “structural, functional, and/or 
biochemical abnormalities in the developing brain” (Cornblatt, 2001). These 
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abnormalities amount to a biological predisposition or vulnerability to psychotic illness 
later in life. This vulnerability may be triggered by stressors in adolescence, as onset 
usually occurs in late-adolescence/early adulthood (Cornblatt, 2008). As schizophrenia is 
an illness with typical onset in adolescence or early adulthood, it is widely believed that 
part of its course is connected with brain development and neural “paring” that occurs in 
adolescence (Shean, 2004; Stewart & Davis, 2008).   
Stress-Diathesis or Stress-Vulnerability Model 
  As discussed in the previous chapter, researchers have agreed on three distinct 
prodromal syndromes; the Genetic Risk with Deterioration (GRD) syndrome, the 
Attenuated Positive Symptoms syndrome (APS), and the Brief Limited Psychotic 
Symptoms (BLIPS) syndrome. One of the most helpful ways to conceive of the 
biopsychosocial model broadly is to approach the entirety of the model not as a specific 
theoretical perspective, but as an integration of many varying theories and etiological 
frameworks. Thus, the stress-diathesis, or stress-vulnerability, model essentially is the 
title given to any collection of biological, social and psychological theories for 
schizophrenia. When conceived in this way, it is certainly a model underpinning much of 
prodromal research and intervention. Of the three prodromal syndromes outlined in the 
previous chapter and mentioned about, the GRD syndrome appears to be most predictive 
of ultra high risk for psychosis. The two other syndromes require at least the presence of 
subclinical or brief positive psychotic symptoms, thereby indicating that psychotic 
processes may have begun. Vulnerability, however, can refer generally to any inborn or 
acquired traits that may predispose one for developing schizophrenia. It has been 
established that many more people in the general population develop psychotic-like 
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symptoms and never develop frank psychosis or schizophrenia (Sass, 1999; Davidson, 
2003). Further, other psychiatric states include the presence of psychotic 
symptomatology, but are not defined by the presence of psychotic symptoms in the way 
that schizophrenia is. Thus, the presence of attenuated symptoms is not seemingly as 
strong an indicator for risk for psychosis as genetic risk is.  
 The graphic flow chart below is one way of conceptualizing the stress-diathesis 
model in relation to the prodrome. While the visual aid might suggest that psychiatric 
outcome is inevitable, the pathways represented below refer to possible outcomes given 
certain vulnerabilities. Further, what the chart does not clarify are protective, mediating 

















 Research does indicate that other vulnerabilities may be indicative of 
predisposition to schizophrenia. As discussed above, these include prenatal and perinatal 
injuries or illnesses, neurodevelopmental irregularities or functional or structural brain 
abnormalities may exist in neo-natal or early childhood, well prior to the onset of the 
prodrome. While the presence of the anomalies is widespread and detectable, it is not 
entirely ubiquitous and homogeneous, once again pointing to the notion that 
schizophrenia is perhaps not a single clinical entity, nor is its cause.  
The stress-vulnerability model allows for a broad range of interaction between 
biological and environmental factors. Most researchers and clinicians have focused on the 
interaction between genetic and experiential factors. As these factors collide and interact, 
it is important to be mindful that this is not a passive process. The process of the collision 
of vulnerability to psychosis and the experiential “stressors” is most readily observed in 
the clinical presentation of the prodrome, where psychotic processes are nascent but not 
fully developed or entrenched. The hope of intervening in this process has led many to 
research methods of treatment in this phase, as will be discuss later in this chapter. One 
theoretical perspective that lays out a framework for understanding the very process by 
which the vulnerability towards psychosis and stressors in the environment or in 
experiential phenomena interact is cognitive theory. Cognitive theory not only can be 
used to explicate the very course of psychotic symptomatology from the prodromal phase 
into chronic psychotic illness, but also offers treatment intervention in the form of 





Cognitive theory is often understood most readily in relation to its clinical 
implementation in cognitive therapy (CT) and cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT). CT 
emerged as an alternative to strict behavioral therapies and to insight-oriented 
psychodynamic therapy.  CBT emerged as a confluence of cognitive theory and earlier 
applications of behavioral treatments.  
Cognitive theory is based on the fundamental principle that information 
processing is the defining feature of human life. Cognition, the act of processing 
information and forming meaning through thoughts and representations, is the primary 
way that humans make sense of their world, both internal and external (Clark, 2009). 
According to cognitive theory, then, humans respond to their mental representations of 
their internal and external environment, rather than directly responding to the 
environment. Just as the environment can change and shift mental representations in the 
form of beliefs, attitudes, cognitions, thoughts and interpretations, so too can the mental 
representations be changed, altered or evaluated. Cognitive theory allows us to describe 
and make sense of the various cognitions and processes that characterize acute 
psychiatric symptomatology. It also is useful in proposing certain pre-existing states or 
vulnerability markers that can be predictive of future psychopathology (Clark, 2009). In 
this way, it is certainly in line with early intervention efforts in prodomal psychotic 
illness, particularly within the biopsychosocial, or stress-diathesis, framework. As Clark 
states, the underlying cognitive vulnerability “remains latent and inactive until triggered 
by a relevant life experience” (2009).  
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One of the important concepts within cognitive theory is that of schemas, which 
refer to cognitive structures that are persistent. Schemas are long-term internal 
representations of “stimuli, ideas or experience that organize and integrate new 
information in a meaningful manner” (Clark, 2009). For those predisposed to 
psychopathology, cognitive theorists propose that maladaptive schemas exist as a result 
of genetic, biological, developmental, learning and many other factors and experiences. 
These experiences lead people to come to meta-conclusions that form “core beliefs,” 
which are fixed, global and over generalized convictions about the self, others, the world 
and the self in relation to external stimuli (Clark, 2009; Beck, et al., 2009). These 
convictions have global consequences as a backdrop to psychiatric disorders.  
CT postulates that many difficulties associated with psychopathology, including 
depression, anxiety and psychosis, can be traced to cognitive distortions. It is 
commonplace to accept the beliefs of those who suffer with anxiety, depression or other 
psychiatric disorders as meaningful within the context of anxious or depressive thought 
processes and therefore crucial to the recovery process. Distorted or maladaptive thought 
patterns are examined and challenged in cognitive-behavioral therapy as a way of helping 
sufferers to redress these pathological ways of thinking. The distorted thought processes 
are believed to influence behavioral and feeling, thereby comprising the constellation of 
pathological symptoms.  
In the case of psychotic symptoms, particularly delusions, hallucinations and 
disordered thought, however, it is commonplace to place the content and process of these 
phenomena outside human comprehension. Cognitive theorists believe that, on the 
contrary, these symptoms are understandable within the same conceptual framework that 
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we understand thought distortions in other clinical disorders and therefore workable or 
responsive as a part of the treatment process (Beck, 2004). As one explanation of 
cognitively oriented understandings of prodromal psychosis put it, “like all people, those 
at risk of psychosis attempt to make sense of their experiences in the light of their earlier 
development and the meaning they attach to events will influence symptoms, emotional 
responses and behavior” (Bechdolf, 2005). In its most basic form, the cognitive model 
posits that events stimulate “automatic thoughts” (based on schemas and loaded with 
psychological meaning for individuals), which then trigger emotional and behavioral 
responses (Beck, 1979, as cited in Beck et al., 2009).  
The experience of prodromal or emerging psychotic symptoms, whether 
attenuated, brief or intermittent, is subject to the ongoing interpretation, dependent on the 
person’s pre-existent schema and the nature of the symptoms. Another significant 
assumption of cognitive theory is the notion that there is a continuum from “normality” to 
psychosis. Rather than postulate that psychosis is located outside the realm of typical 
experience, cognitive theory asserts that experiences that have psychotic themes are much 
more common and exist along a spectrum of severity. This also fits well within the 
conceptualization of the prodrome, as it is often characterized by attenuated symptoms 
that do not meet the criteria for frank psychosis in severity or conviction. The researchers 
who developed and train other clinicians in the SIPS/SOPS diagnostic measures state,  
“one of the key determinants of a symptom being considered attenuated and not at a fully 
psychotic level of intensity is the lack of conviction regarding the externally generated, 
“real” nature of the symptom as well as the maintenance of insight” (Miller et al., 2003). 
Therefore we can see that, for example suspicion is a relatively common experience, a 
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person in the prodromal state may say, “I am fairly sure they watch me everyday”, a 
person with psychosis states, “I know they are watching me everyday.” The degree to 
which a person locates their experience of distress in externalized sources is a main 
component of differentially diagnosing the prodrome versus frank psychosis. Such a 
phenomenon is known as “externalizing bias” in CT and is discussed ore below.  
 In schizophrenia, an individual’s fundamental orientation is a reflection of their 
distorted internal representations, according to cognitive theory. These representations, in 
the case of psychotic illness, often predate the full expression of psychosis and thought 
disorder. For instance, a person who has a cognitive vulnerability to schizophrenia may 
have a fundamental belief or orientation of “me against them,”  which is a precursor to 
and foundation for externalized delusions and hallucinations with persecutory themes. 
Cognitive distortions are in and of themselves seen as a vulnerability marker for 
schizophrenic illness. Many of the distorted ways of thinking become solidified and 
permanent during the highly stressful time period of the prodrome.  As Beck describes it, 
these “representation makes patients vulnerable to experiencing non-psychotic reactions 
such as suspiciousness, depression, and anxiety, and they provide the substrate for the 
formation of delusions” (2009). Frequently, the dysfunctional thinking process whereby 
these distorted representations are manifest occurs at a time where life situations 
(rejection, isolation, major life change) are targets of a person’s cognitive vulnerabilities. 
When thinking about the nature of prodromal symptoms, we know that often what 
distinguishes the prodrome from frank psychosis is the severity, frequency and conviction 
of a person’s suspicious, bizarre or delusional thinking. In fact, the ideas a person has at 
the prodromal stage may be more open to reality checking. As an example, in the case of 
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James, he believed that there was a possibility that George Bush was involved in 9/11, 
but was not absolutely convinced of it and was certainly not driven to act on these beliefs 
or ideas. This belief could have been probed and possibly tested against evidence to the 
contrary. This would then allow James to learn the coping skill of reality testing intrusive 
and disturbing thoughts, rather than continue to perseverate on the, potentially further 
deepening the beliefs toward delusion.  
Cognitive Theory of Delusions and Hallucinations 
Many of the positive symptoms of psychosis are conceptualized within the 
cognitive theoretical outline as reflections of biased thinking (Beck, 2004). Biases in 
thinking are seen in the individual’s highly selective attention to their misinterpreted 
experience. These experiences are highlighted and become “hypersalient” (Beck et al., 
2009) to the individual.  
One of the most distinct differences between the prodrome and frank psychosis in 
the cognitive model is the notion that core beliefs meet with experience in a way that is a 
progressive continuum from maladaptive interpretations to psychotic experience. The 
paranoid beliefs run from “soft”, or open to influence, in the prodrome to “hard,” or 
fixed, in frank psychosis. Each symptom typically arises from distinct sensory domains, 
but all stem from the fundamental core schema underlying an individual’s proclivity to 
particular biases. One such bias is an “externalizing bias,” which refers to the tendency of 
cognitively at-risk individuals to believe that other people are dangerous or contemptuous 
of them. These individuals are not able to acknowledge that these interpretations arise 
from their own cognitive sensitivities and orientation, rather than from external sources 
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(Beck, 2004). This externalizing bias leads those at risk to have the sense that the input 
they are detecting has come from an external source, rather than from their own thoughts. 
 Individuals at risk also tend to have an egocentric bias, referring to thinking in 
psychosis where irrelevant events are attributed to have personal meaning (Beck, 2004). 
This is especially salient given that this referential thinking is often solidified during the 
course of the prodrome by a process that could be deemed a “self-fulfilling prophesy.” 
An individual at risk for psychosis holds core beliefs that his environment is hostile and 
that he is at the center of this hostility. These foundational thoughts form a basis for the 
individual to over-attend to experiences that are perceived as hostile. The individual 
becomes hyperattentive as a way of managing the feelings of vulnerability and fear of 
danger associated with this perceived hostility. Any perceived threat is then collected as 
“evidence” of this hostility aimed at the individual, feeding the belief that the individual 
is the center of his environment. This cycle continues, forming the “self-fulfilling 
prophesy” as described above. 
Cognitive Theory of Negative Symptoms 
Similar to cognitive conceptions of positive symptoms, cognitive theory posits 
that many individuals predisposed to psychotic illness have latent and inherent cognitive 
vulnerabilities that lend well to the development of hallmark negative symptoms.  While 
positive symptoms have been seen has the defining features of schizophrenia and 
psychosis, negative symptoms like alogia, paucity of speech, thought blocking, social 
withdrawal and avolition have often been given less attention, especially within the 
medical model, as negative symptoms are less likely to respond to psychopharmacology 
(Beck et al., 2009). These symptoms, however, are important features of schizophrenia 
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and have been since the time of Kraepelin and Bleuler. Beck et al. explain that prominent 
negative symptoms, which are quite obvious in many patients with schizophrenia, mark 
the absence of healthy behavioral and internal responses to stimuli (2009). They further 
explicate that reduced verbal and nonverbal expression and lack of engagement in 
constructive, pleasurable or social activities are outward reflections of internal working 
models, likely established because of neurocognitive impairment. These factors lead to 
emotional and behavioral deficits.  Dysfunctional and negative belief schemas further 
exacerbate distorted thought processes, creating expectations that are negative or 
maladaptive. Research has shown that people suffering from schizophrenic illness are 
especially prone to having expectations of self-defeat, poor performance, and social 
ineptness (Beck et al., 2009). These beliefs, according to cognitive theorists and 
practitioners, feed into social aversion, avoidance, apathy and social withdrawal, 
independent of levels of depression, anxiety, positive symptoms, and disordered thought 
(Beck et al., 2009). This entire process summarizes the presentation of negative psychotic 
symptoms.  
Research on Cognitively-Oriented Treatments 
Dysfunctional cognitive functioning is not considered sufficient or even necessary 
to cause a psychiatric disorder. Rather, cognitive theorists insist on the confluence of 
biological, genetic, social, developmental, emotional and psychological factors in 
explaining psychopathology broadly, schizophrenia and its prodrome more precisely. The 
following is a review of the literature and research describing cognitive aspects of the 
prodrome.  
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 Extensive research has been done in identifying cognitive vulnerabilities in 
putatively prodromal individuals. One study administered a comprehensive 
neurocognitive battery and clinical assessment on 37 participants who met Criteria for 
Prodromal States (COPS) and compared the data to 47 healthy subjects and 59 first 
episode of psychosis individuals. The results revealed that high-risk individuals 
performed more poorly compared to the healthy control group, but better than the first-
episode group (Keefe et al., 2006). Several studies have essentially replicated this design 
and found similar results, that at-risk individuals performed between healthy controls and 
first-episode subjects on neurocognitive tests (Eastvold, 2007; McGlashan et al., 2010). 
The researchers also discovered that the high-risk subjects struggled with processing 
speed and measures of vigilance, memory and attention, among many other global 
measures of cognitive proficiency.These studies help to corroborate evidence that 
neurocognitive deficits are indeed present during the prodromal phase and deteriorate 
further after the first episode of frank psychosis.  
A double-blind study randomly assigned putatively prodromal individuals (using 
SOPS criteria) to take olanzapine or to the control placebo group. Neuropsychological 
tests were administered to each group and were repeated at 6 months and 12 months. The 
results showed that neruocognitive deficits were present in each group and that 
olanzapine had no effect on these deficits, also suggesting that cognitive vulnerability is a 
pre-morbid state in individuals at risk for developing psychosis (Hawkins et al., 2008). 
Once again, this asserts that cognitive vulnerability does indeed pre-date the onset of 
psychosis and is perhaps not responsive to antipsychotic medication, thereby implying 
the need for more psychologically based cognitive treatment approaches.  
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As biopsychosocial perspectives on schizophrenia have become more pervasive, 
alternative treatment modalities to antipsychotic medication have been explored. While 
the primary treatment of choice for psychosis remains psychotropic medication, the limits 
of these drugs have been recognized. Side effects of both first and second-generation 
antipsychotics have been well documented and many patients must balance out the risks 
of using such drugs with the short and long-term benefits (Nelson & Yung, 2008). It is 
also well-documented that outcomes for patients with schizophrenia are much worse in 
developed nations, where higher doses of antipsychotic medication is the norm, than in 
the third world, where patients with schizophrenia are not given antipsychotic drugs in 
such high doses, frequency and duration (Seikkula & Olsen, 2003). Further, a great 
majority of patients who are prescribed antipsychotic medication and take them as 
directed continue to have residual refractory symptoms that do not respond to 
psychopharmacology (Serruya & Grant, 2009) The need for supportive housing, 
vocational support, case management, family support, crisis intervention and general 
clinical support, including supportive counseling has long been accepted as the gold 
standard of treatment for psychotic illness, particularly in chronic and severe cases. These 
approaches have also been transferred generally to prodromal populations (Nelson & 
Barnaby, 2008). The genesis of more psychologically oriented treatment interventions 
has primarily focused on either supportive psychotherapy or cognitively oriented 
psychotherapy. Nelson and Yung openly recognize the need for more research on the use 
of psychopharmacological treatment in the Ultra-High-Risk population (2008).  
Research is limited on medication treatment in the prodrome, side effects can be 
serious and long term treatment with such antipsychotic medication is not ideal, 
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especially for patients who are not yet fully psychotic. However, the narrowing of 
predictive diagnostic measures seems to introduce the imperative to look for other safer 
treatment models.  
Beck made early hypotheses in 1979 about the malleability of psychotic 
delusional thinking, postulating that schizophrenic delusions were indeed open to reality 
testing and were therefore representative of inherent cognitive misinterpretation (Beck, 
1979 as cited in Beck et al., 2009). This paved the way for specific cognitive treatments 
of schizophrenia, such as Cognitive Behavioral Therapy for Psychosis.  
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy for Psychosis (CBTp) is a modified version of 
CBT that has broadly influenced treatment of schizophrenia. CBT is a very popular 
treatment in general at this time, given the motivation for evidence-based treatment 
modalities that work on specific symptoms that can be measured pre- and post-treatment.  
CBT has been applied to many different symptom clusters in schizophrenia: anxiety, 
reality testing, negative symptoms like social withdrawal and avolition, positive 
symptoms like delusions and hallucinations, depressive symptoms and symptoms of 
thought disorder. CBT has also been applied in group settings, as well as directed 
individual psychotherapy. For these reasons, it is difficult to summarize the totality of 
CBT’s impact in treating psychosis, as comparison across the literature is thwarted 
because of different measurement use, milieu, and target symptoms.  
One study showed that after thirteen sessions of group CBT, there was a 
significant reduction in the delusional conviction and distress related to the delusion 
(Landa et al., 2006).  Tarrier et al. conducted a randomized control study and 18-month 
follow-up with acutely psychotic patients measuring positive symptoms, time between 
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relapse and re-hospitalization that showed that there was a significant benefit to CBT 
versus treatment as usual, as measured using the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale 
(PANSS) instrument (2004). The results of this study also supported significant 
improvement in the intensity and frequency of hallucinations with the use of CBT.  
 According to a randomized controlled trial conducted at the PACE clinic that 
compared cognitive therapy with treatment as usual in 58 patients at ultra high risk of 
developing a first episode of psychosis, UHR patients tolerated CBT, which appeared to 
be efficacious in preventing conversion to psychosis. Participants were screened using the 
PANSS instrument, which considers subclinical symptoms or brief psychotic symptoms 
(Morrison et al., 2004). Therapy was provided over 6 months, and all patients were 
monitored on a monthly basis for 12 months. The CBT group was significantly less likely 
to develop frank psychosis over the twelve-month period. Positive symptoms, if present, 
were also significantly reduced (Morrison, 2004) 
Cognitive-Behavioral Paradigm  
Cognitive therapy and cognitive behavioral therapy are collaborative, problem-
solving oriented, and educational interventions that are time-limited and involve 
structured and directed sessions with the client and therapist (Morrison, 2008).  The client 
is assessed based on the presenting disorder and homework is given that targets specific 
symptomotalogy (Morrison, 2008). In the CBT paradigm, automatic thoughts are 
addressed by examining the relationship between the event, thoughts, feelings and 
behaviors.  
CBT for psychosis has been shown, as stated above, to be effective in treating 
many difficulties due to psychotic symtoms. The efficacy of these treatment methods, 
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cognitive theory’s relatively easy applicability to the prodrome and the seemingly safe 
and gentle effects of CBT have led many researchers to approach the prodrome from a 
cognitive-behavioral treatment standpoint. While CBT may be an appropriate theoretical 
lens for the prodrome, studies have not been altogether conclusive of its effectiveness in 
treating specific symptoms of the prodrome, including attenuated positive symptoms and 
over all social and role functioning adjustment. For instance, in one study, supportive 
counseling treatment and CBT were compared in efficacy for increasing social 
adjustment scores in subjects at high risk. Interestingly, both treatments were effective 
and there was no significant difference between the CBT and supportive counseling 
(Bechdolf, 2007). However, in a frequently cited study by Morrison et al. in the United 
Kingdom, cognitive therapy significantly reduced the likelihood of making progression to 
psychosis as defined on the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale over 12 months and 
also significantly improved positive symptoms over the course of the research (Morrison, 
2004). This study measured different aspects of the prodrome, because it was measured 
by a different instrument (the PANNS), rather than the COPS/SOPS measures.   
There remains a lot of interest and research on the application of CBT and 
cognitively oriented treatments to the prodromal phase. There may in fact be evidence to 
suggest that CBT is appropriate for certain individuals with certain prodromal 
symptomatology, while CBT could be inappropriate, less effective or triggering to some 
prodromal patients (Grazebrooke, 2004). Below, I will explore the case of James as an 




Application to Case Material 
The case of James is a complex and at times perplexing case. When looked at 
from a biopsychosocial model, specifically within a cognitive theoretical, many variables 
must be considered. Firstly, it would be important to tease out the symptom picture more 
fully. James presents with what appear to be depressive symptoms- avolition, anhedonia, 
and loss of interest in previous activities. Some of these characteristics could also be 
classified as neurovegetative and also include sleep-wake reversal and difficulty 
concentrating (in school). Also of note, James has isolated himself from his family and 
friends, he has a notable decline in school functioning, ultimately leading to school 
refusal. His self-care has diminished. He shows signs of unusual thought content- 
including violent and nihilistic thoughts. He has had some suspicion (i.e. people looking 
at him menacingly), grandiosity (becoming a rap star) and perceptual abnormalities 
(hearing his name in the wind). The presence of these symptoms is certainly sub-
psychotic. Likely, if evaluated with the SIPS/SOPS semi-structured interview, James 
would meet criteria for the prodromal state, especially if his mother’s episode is 
considered as a family history of psychosis, placing him in the genetic risk plus recent 
decline in functioning group (GRD). However, his attenuated positive symptoms are also 
of interest, along with his cognitive decline- specifically his inability to complete 
unstructured tasks, difficulty with memory and confusion. He is also experiencing 
perceptual abnormalities that fall below clinical symptomology, but that include hearing 
his voice in the wind and having the vague sense of déjà vu.  As will be explored from a 
cognitive perspective, the connection between James’ core beliefs about himself and the 
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world and how he interprets his experience would play a significant role in the 
attributions he makes about these difficulties.  
James has a history of clumsiness, awkwardness and social difficulties, all of 
which are vague in nature. He has a history of “inattention without hyperactivity”, 
indicating the possibility of early cognitive deficiencies, which have been shown to 
frequently proceed prodromal onset. While the case cites a family history of psychosis, 
upon closer inspection, this episode does not appear to meet criteria for a full-blown 
frank psychotic episode. Firstly, his mother reports a distinct misunderstanding between 
her experience and what the treatment providers understood to be happening. Mother 
reported that she heard the voice of her uncle, recently deceased at the time, whose name 
happened to be Jimmy Carter. James’ mother reports she was hearing the voice of this 
uncle, which was interpreted as psychotic hallucinations, but may have been a culturally 
appropriate response to the death of a loved family member. As we do not have much 
background from the case material, other than a brief passing mention that James is “a 
young black man”, it would have been helpful for the interviewing clinician to inquire 
about James’ background, cultural beliefs and values. This may have then provided the 
information necessary to better understand his mother’s experience of audio 
hallucinations. For instance, in many cultures around the world, it is not unusual for 
surviving family members to have audio or visual hallucinations or visions of dead 
family members (Whaley & Hall, 2009). In the case material, we hear James’ mother 
clarify that there was confusion about the nature of her audio hallucinations, namely that 
her dead relative shared a name with a past president. Since psychotic hallucinations and 
delusions often contain ideas of reference or bizarre references to figures in authority, it 
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would be cause for suspicion if she had claimed to be hearing President Jimmy Carter’s 
voice. However, this was not the case, rather, it was her uncle Jimmy Carter she was 
hearing. Because there are culturally sanctioned experiences that mimic psychosis, it 
would be vital to understanding James’ family history to look further into the cultural 
relevance of psychotic-like experiences. As I explore more in depth in the next chapter, 
psychotic-like experience is not as rare as many people believe it is.  
Cognitive theory has many interesting implications, given the potential for 
prodromal psychosis within the case material presented above. Beck et al. indicate that 
cognitive abnormalities predate the onset of psychotic symptoms in many patients who 
go on to develop schizophrenia. These cognitive insufficiencies or vulnerabilities can 
have a significant impact on an individual’s functioning in social and academic settings. 
These vulnerabilities, along with other biopsychosocial sensitivities, meet with stress and 
can set up conditions that are prime for the development of psychosis. Neurocognitive 
difficulties, along with socialization problems and psychological problems contribute to 
lowered motivation and interfere with young people’s ability to develop appropriate skills 
for managing social situations (Beck et al., 2009). This can frequently reiterate or support 
any fundamental core beliefs the person may have in their schematic understanding, 
particularly beliefs about other people being dangerous, a “me vs. them” schema. Quite 
typically, “these individuals either voluntarily withdraw from social interactions or 
experience social isolation from others” (Beck, 2009).  This is evident in James’ extreme 
social withdrawal starting after his trip to South Carolina in the summer.  
Beck et al. note that dysfunctional cognitive schemas are crucial in the onset of 
hallucinations and delusions, as discussed above relative to frank psychosis. These 
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maladaptive beliefs are often the result of stressful conditions or experiences that lead to 
conclusions like “I’m inferior” or “People are against me” (Beck et al., 2009). These core 
beliefs, as revealed in automatic thoughts, are the result of life experiences. In the case of 
James, he has come to the belief that people in his neighborhood are dangerous and are 
looking at him strangely. While few articles have discussed the significant of 
sociocultural variables in the development of cognitive schema or prodromal psychosis, 
these factors have likely loomed large and probably largely unconsciously in the life of 
this young man. As a Black adolescent male in an urban setting, he may actually be 
experiencing racial microaggressions in his community and perceiving them as personal 
attacks. Given that he grew up in this community, this stress would have been enduring 
and insidious. Now that he has sought help from highly privileged psychiatrists, who are 
indeed white (given that we know who the authors of the article are). His suspicion, a 
natural reaction under racially tense circumstances in which one is simultaneously 
perceived as and perceives a threat, has become embedded as an internalized cognitive 
structure. James’ sense that George Bush might have had something to do with 9/11, 
which referential and perhaps paranoid in nature, was actually a relatively widespread 
idea in New York after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade towers, another example 
of a “symptom” that may seem to be evidence of paranoia out of context. Many people 
living in New York shared similar beliefs, as many “conspiracy theories” were swirling 
around the frightening terrorist attacks on American soil. However, given the other 
surrounding difficulties James is experiencing, it would make sense to explore this belief 
or notion further within the context of cognitive psychotic vulnerability.  
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There is evidence from the case material that suggests that James had cognitive 
and social vulnerabilities from a young age. This could have led to internalized 
representations of the world, his sense of self and other people that were maladaptive. For 
instance, if he struggled with social interactions and spontaneous skills in interpersonal 
relationships (such as with schoolmates), this may have contributed to an internal 
cognitive structure that led him to conclude that he was different and others were not easy 
to relate to. When his schoolmates perhaps teased him or did not readily associate with 
him, as is suggested by the report that his teachers perceived him as vulnerable and tried 
to protect him, this may have reinforced the burgeoning schematic structure. This 
underlying cognitive vulnerability impacted his ability to modulate stressful situations as 
they arose and as his development proceeded through adolescence.  
James is exhibiting signs that he has externalized his core beliefs of himself as 
perhaps powerless and inferior, as evidence by his sense that people in his neighborhood 
are viewing him as menacing and his community is dangerous. He also has a sense that 
he might be able to prove himself by becoming a famous rap star and passing God’s 
message of peace and love. Beck et al. hypothesize in their cognitive conception of 
psychosis that often times an inflated sense of one’s own power, as is observed in 
grandiose thoughts and delusions, is indicative of a core view of the self as inadequate 
and others as superior. This is then defended against by portraying oneself as much more 
important and others has inferior. James also has notions of blowing up the earth by 
planting a bomb at the center of the planet. This thought or cognition displays not only 
grandiosity, but also magical thinking, which is also reflective of a similar core schema of 
feeling powerless (Beck et al., 2009).  
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Based on the cognitive interpretation above, James’ impaired intellectual or 
cognitive functioning from an early age has made him quite prone to the fundamental 
attribution error, causing him to automatically attribute many life experiences, 
particularly thoughts, to external causes (Beck et al., 2009). These attributional errors are 
often concerned with threat in high-risk individuals, who often accumulate evidence that 
supports their sense of externalization. While he does not state openly what he attributes 
his difficulties to, it is clear from the ensuing interview that he has concerns about threats 
outside of himself. 
 In cognitive theory, the prodrome is marked by the collision of vulnerability 
factors with stressors in the person’s life experience. The schemas that make up core 
negative or maladaptive belief representations become “hypersalient” (Beck et al., 2009) 
and go unchecked by healthy reality testing processes. If continued without intervention, 
automatic thoughts and hypersalient beliefs can become more solidified by emotional and 
behavioral reactions to these disturbing thoughts in the form of social aversion and 
emotional withdrawal. As these beliefs move from “soft” to “hard” through the process of 
attributing internal processes to externalized entities, subclinical symptoms may become 
more crystallized and prominent. For these reasons, motivation to identify and treat the 
prodrome is high, particularly for individuals like James, whose family history of 










The second theoretical perspective that will be explored and applied to the clinical 
phenomena of prodromal schizophrenia is the postmodern perspective, specifically 
dialogic theory and the Open Dialogue Approach. This chapter will outline the 
fundamental principles of the broad contextual stance of postmodern theory, then will 
apply the postmodern stance generally to schizophrenia and the prodrome. I will then 
explore in depth dialogism and the Open Dialogue Approach. Dialogism and Open 
Dialogue will be applied to the case of James and will be used to understand the 
prodrome to schizophrenia from a postmodern lens.  
Postmodernism: A Response to Modernism 
It is important to understand the larger context of postmodern theory as it applies 
to mental health and illness before delving deeper into one specific theory from within 
this framework. In this section, I will broadly explore postmodernist theory as it applies 
to psychiatric illness concepts. It will be first necessary to explore the notion of 
modernism, to which postmodernism is a response.  
Postmodernism, as it were, is a sweeping term referring to a philosophical or 
paradigmatic shift in how we view ourselves and the world. The postmodernist paradigm 
arose in response to the modernist paradigm that had dominated our worldview since the 
time of the Enlightenment. The focus that characterized the Enlightenment period of the 
18th Century was on truth by way of reason. Modernist or Enlightenment thinkers were 
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responding to the medieval paradigm, which was dominated by superstition, fear, and 
dogmatic religious belief. The notion that humans were superior among all living beings 
inhabiting the earth became paramount during the Enlightenment. According to this 
philosophical perspective, what set humans apart from other beings was their ability to 
reason and to objectively know truth. That an objectively knowable truth existed and this 
truth was not ruled by superstition, supernatural belief or religious faith led to a belief 
that the world was “ordered according to the dictates of reason; a world shaped by 
science, technology and the primacy of efficiency”  (Bracken & Thomas, 2005).  For this 
reason, scientific inquiry became of primary significance, as modernism asserts that the 
objective truth can only be ascertained by rigorous and scientific methods, such as 
medicine and research. 
Psychiatry and much of the mental health field has been dominated by a highly 
modernist approach. In fact, the biopsychosocial perspective is indeed a modernist 
framework, albeit a broadly encompassing and less reductionist one. The 
biospsychosocial perspective seeks to identify and understand the causes, courses and 
treatments for human suffering, taking into consideration a confluence of various factors. 
The very pursuit of valid and reliable measures for diagnosing individuals with mental 
disorders is an entirely modernist agenda. Effective treatments imply cause and effect, 
reflecting an objective state of human wellbeing and thereby knowable categories of 
illness. Therefore, our typical conceptions of diagnosis, such as the DSM-IV (and other 
diagnostic manuals), and treatment, such as Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy, are examples 
of modernist practices based on modernist theories. Modernist theories are also often 
referred to as the positivist position. Positivism refers to the approach to knowledge as 
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objectively, positively identified sensory experience, which is considered the preferred 
way of knowing. This position is explored more in depth below.  
 In this section, I will explain the broad context for postmodern theory and use 
Foucault’s philosophy to ground the theory. Postmodern thinking is not an outright 
rejection of modernism, but involves bringing awareness to its limitations. One theorist 
that has exemplified a postmodern response to modernism is Michel Foucault. The 
application of a postmodern paradigm to mental health and mental illness is well captured 
by Foucault, who was a dominant postmodernist dissenter to our traditional conceptions 
of psychiatry, mental illness, mental health and psychology. While the preceding terms, 
including psychiatry and psychology, are by no means synonymous, nor do they 
encapsulate the entirety of the modernist enterprise, the terms will be used as entre to 
more a grounded grasp the postmodern critique of modernism.  The following paragraph 
will outline Foucault’s influential critique of the modern position in mental health.  
Foucault is particularly critical of psychiatry and psychology’s claims to 
objectively knowable categories of illness of the mind. He records a history of how 
madness became known to be an illness and then a specific mental illness. As he states in 
Mental Illness and Psychology (1976),   “it was only the arrival of the calm, objective, 
scientific gaze of modern medicine that what had previously been regarded as 
supernatural perversion was seen as the deterioration of nature” (p. 65). Foucault 
identifies the “calm, objective gaze” as one of modern society’s preeminent social 
controls and believes that this gaze is present in clinics, hospitals, and prisons among 
other professional settings. According to modernists, there is an objective notion of what 
man’s “nature” should be and this is the standard by which all beings are measured. The 
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scientific gaze is used to judge and categorize abnormality in relation to these “natural” 
categories of normality. When the gaze falls upon “atypical” or disturbing behavior, 
thoughts or ways of relating, individuals exhibiting these attributes are given labels 
describing their deviation from the norm. Foucault also calls to attention the way that we 
are invested in the  “dividing up of social space according to the lines of valuation and 
exclusion” (1976). Each culture has a different configuration of this divide and this shifts 
over time. The practices each society implements to define the life of the “madman” 
indicate that culture’s comfort with the deviation from “nature.” I would be remiss to not 
mention that Foucault’s postmodern approach to mental illness if often critiqued for its 
somewhat romanticized vision of mental illness; that illness is defined from outside of the 
individual by professionals as a way of social control. This approach does indeed appear 
to neglect the very real subjective pain of people suffering from mental anguish. This is 
one reason that postmodern writers have begun to give such attention to subjective 
experiences of those suffering from such anguish, which is discussed below.  
Diagnosing madness, or more precisely mental illnesses, then is a project of 
modernity. This project has to do with describing what constitutes “abnormality.”  Many 
postmodern thinkers have critiqued this project as inherently flawed. They criticize that 
rather than identifying why and what exactly defines and causes abnormality, modern 
psychiatry locates the problem within the person. In other words, defining mental illness 
is about defending conceptualizations of normality. The postmodern critique maintains 
that categories of deviation from this notion of normality are not pre-existing forms of 
nature, but rather are constantly redefined in relation to social values. Each diagnosis is a 
social construction that we honor based on our system of values. Our system of values is 
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expressed in what Foucault calls “discourse,” which is a how language expresses formal 
discussion, usually referring to social boundaries (1976). The discourse in relation to 
psychiatric illness and suffering (and subsequent treatment) is subject to what Foucault 
calls the “clinical discourse.” Foucault and many other social theorists believe that 
madness or deviant human behavior has moved towards medicalization as a method of 
social control. This in turn has a dramatic effect on individuals’ behavior and experience. 
Many social theorists posit that discourses are extremely important because the do impact 
peoples’ real lived experience. The available theories of knowledge and current discourse 
act like blueprints for experience. For example, a person having unusual perception or 
sensory experiences may feel quite distressed, not only by the actual experiences 
themselves, but also by what the person knows might be signs of “becoming crazy,” 
based on the prevailing discourse on what “crazy” means.  
Critique of Positivism 
In this section, I will further explicate the modernist perspective of positivism in 
relation to postmodern critiques of this position. Positivism, part of the philosophical 
foundation of modern psychiatry, is a position that claims that our objective observable 
sensory experience is the only valid source of knowledge about reality (Nelson et al., 
2007).  Positivism claims that operational definitions describe objects in terms of the 
“specific processes or tests used to determine its presence of quantity” (Nelson et al., 
2007). For instance, in psychiatric diagnosis, this process is reflected in the descriptive 
categories of symptoms, which are collected and organized by professionals, but 
understood to be descriptions of already existent natural categories. A simpler example is 
the notion of measuring an object’s length, whereby the tool for measurement must be 
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objectively tested and publicly agreed upon. Such is also the case with measures for 
diagnosing clinical entities, including the prodrome to psychosis; the measures must be 
tested and agreed upon by the psychiatric community. While most researchers and 
clinicians acknowledge the constructive aspects of their diagnostic tools, as evidenced by 
the constant redefinition of diagnostic assessment tools, modern psychiatry generally 
claims to be in pursuit of fully defining phenomena that exist clinically; ultimately 
moving closer to objective truth.  
Postmodernism in general objects to the aforementioned approach, given that it is 
indeed replete with presuppositions, theoretical biases and assumptions that allow 
psychiatry to make claims to objective knowledge. Instead of coming closer to 
objectively knowable truth, positivism only serves to privilege one set of beliefs over 
other beliefs, often known as narratives. The notion of narratives is grounded in 
postmodernism and refers to the idea that rather than the existence of a singular truth that 
must be ascertained through scientific rigor, human experience is actually much more 
multidimensional. The story of biological psychiatry and the medical model of mental 
illness is merely one way of explaining or understanding schizophrenia or psychosis as 
part of human experience. When we give preference to this modernist perspective, we 
tend to silence or ignore other ways of conceptualizing these phenomena. This is 
especially evident in the neglect of individuals’ subjective experiences of schizophrenia 
or psychosis, which are almost always missing in research, diagnosis and treatment of 
such disorders. A researcher’s position in examining schizophrenia often speaks to his or 
her underlying assumptions about the nature of the illness and subjects diagnosed with 
schizophrenia. It is often stated that individuals with schizophrenia lack insight into their 
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illness. This could partly explain the general avoidance of subjective interviews or 
surveys of patients’ psychotic experience. Researchers’ positions regarding schizophrenia 
are often colored by the theoretical presuppositions inherent in their understanding of the 
clinical phenomena.  Subjective experiences of individuals experiencing mental illness 
will be examined more at length below. 
Critique of Modernist Concept of Schizophrenia 
 In examining the diagnostic category that has subsumed experiences called 
schizophrenia, postmodern theorists are critical of many assumptions that precede these 
categorizations. Taking up the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, as it is seen as a 
guidebook for practitioners, researchers and diagnosticians, and has become inextricably 
linked with our understanding of mental illness, Irene Harvey indicates that this manual 
only serves to describe categories or symptoms (referring to DSM III-R; 1987).  
Describing categories of illness is a task that does not benefit most patients, as it does not 
probe precipitating factors or causation. It is also fraught with assumptions about 
normality. For instance, Harvey illuminates one aspect of diagnostics in schizophrenia- 
the absurd nature of delusions. Referring to utter lack of grounding in reality, “absurdity” 
is not diagnosed or defined in the DSM, rather it is simply pre-understood. In other 
words, any “healthy” individual would be well aware and grounded in reality enough to 
recognize absurdity when confronted with such (1987).  Further, the DSM III includes 
symptom check-lists for the presence of such phenomena as “content of thought,” which 
in schizophrenia so defined can include “overvalued ideas” and “markedly illogical 
thinking” (i.e. clear internal contradictions or clearly erroneous conclusions). What is 
overvalued or markedly illogical is once again based on a subjective assumptive position, 
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a position of “normality,” which “has its history just as madness does, and it is a result of 
a product, not a pure natural origin that might fall into madness- or, in this case 
schizophrenia (Harvey, 1987). Harvey also criticizes the manual’s writers’ foregone 
conclusion that speech is the best way to know thought content and therefore mental state 
(1987). She argues that relying on spoken language to ascertain an individual’s mental 
state is also an act of assumption.  
 Further, the arbiter of defining the assumption we come to call “normal” is almost 
always a person in a position of power; a clinician, doctor, judge, prison guard, 
researcher, etcetera. The application of the clinical gaze is a way of sorting out the social 
categories of normal and abnormal. As Kovel puts it, psychiatry’s effort towards raising 
mental disorders to the conceptual level of disease gives a certain “grandeur” (1987) to 
diagnosis of mental anguish or suffering. Disease, in modernist theory, is a pure, real 
thing- in-itself (Kovel, 1987) that can be objectively known, studied, quantified. While 
there are widely variant, highly technical and specific critiques by myriad postmodern 
thinkers, the preceding examples are provided as a jumping off point for the general 
flavor of postmodern theoretical approaches. In fact, as Bracken and Thomas (2005) 
state, “postmodern thought represents a struggle to free ourselves from the idea that there 
is only one path to the truth, one way of using reason, one form that science and serious 
reflection should take” (p. 95). There are many postmodern theories, thus ongoing 
critique of positivist or modernist psychiatry could be made ad nauseum. Postmodernism 
can broadly be seen as a perspective that does not privilege any single method, paradigm, 
or authority but rather seeks to hold a multiplicity of possible truths in response to the 
single narrative of scientific modernism claim to truth.  
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Subjective Narratives 
 One way to move from the broad theoretical base and to dig more fully into the 
phenomena of schizophrenia and its prodrome is to explore subjective narratives of 
individuals with these experiences. In order to more deeply understand the postmodern 
position on schizophrenic experience and its prodrome, I will use phenomenological and 
narrative approaches to explore and ground the fate and lived experience of these 
individuals. By way of including marginalized narratives, many postmodern critics have 
sought to provide a space for the voices of those diagnosed with schizophrenia, those 
experiencing their first psychotic episode and those at risk. In the section below, I will 
discuss and explore how phenomenology uses first-person narratives not to explain the 
etiology of psychosis and psychotic risk, but as a descriptive practice that is intended to 
bring out essential features or characteristics of schizophrenic experience.  
 In this paragraph, I will look at the notion of the self as it emerges from narratives 
of those having from psychotic experiences. Phenomenological critiques of modern 
psychiatry have described the subjective experiences of people suffering from 
experiences labeled psychosis or schizophrenia, as discussed above. The relevance of 
subjective experience is crucial from a postmodern perspective, given that the experience 
of psychosis is so alienating, isolating, unbearably frightening and difficult to describe 
(Seikkula, 2003). Further, these individuals are experiencing a crisis or disturbance of 
their fundamental sense of self (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008; Nelson et al., 2007). While 
notions of the “self” vary among theorists, part of the postmodern and phenomenological 
pursuit is to give voice through language and discourse to previously silenced voices. 
Expressions of psychotic disturbance and the close examination of subjective experience 
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shed light on the distortion of the self and subjectivity in psychotic disorder, but do not 
define the self objectively. This is especially the case in ultra-high-risk cases, where the 
onset of symptoms may be signaling a serious disturbance of the self and a crisis of 
meaning-making. Sass states that the descent into psychosis leads to the loss of an 
individual’s sense of active intentionality and integrated sense of self (1999).  
Phenomenology of Schizophrenia and the Self 
 Nelson et al. explore the subjective dimensions of individuals at risk for psychosis, 
stating, “what brings a patient to the psychiatrist is a disturbance in their experience of 
self, others and world, not a complaint about abnormal activity of neurotransmitters” 
(2007).  Nelson and colleagues discuss descriptions of anomalous subjective events in 
ultra-high risk individuals. These descriptions of unusual subjective events include 
anomalies of self-identity, awareness, affect, perception, etcetera (2007). The lack of 
these descriptions in the literature have been foregone in preference for reliable and valid 
measures, which Nelson et al. critique. The existing criteria for diagnosing Ultra High 
Risk (UHR) patients does not include subjective experience, which includes anomalies of 
affect, cognition, perception and body-motor experience (2007).  In an in-depth study of 
self-disturbance in psychosis conducted in Denmark, analysis of the data revealed that 
self-disturbance is highly specific to schizophrenic illness. This research group also 
discovered that pre-schizophrenic prodromes were marked by the significance of self-
disturbance. Marked self-disturbance, as measured by the Examination of Anomalous 
Self- Experience instrument (EASE), was strongly indicative of the development of a 
schizophrenia spectrum disorder (Parnas et al., 2005; Parnas & Handest, 2003).  From 
this research, we can conclude that a disturbance of self-experience or sense of self is a 
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fundamental hallmark of schizophrenic illness, more so that in any other 
psychopathology, and that this disturbance predates the onset of full-blown psychosis. 
Therefore, the significance of subjective experience of the self is of paramount concern in 
understanding the prodrome.  
 The exclusion of subjective experience of an individual’s altered sense of self in 
psychosis has long been problematic for postmodern thinkers. In this section, I will 
discuss some of the ways that self-disturbance can occur in psychosis and the prodrome 
and outline how these have been generally excluded from the literature. As Sass outlines, 
many schizophrenic patients lose their sense of an integrated self and active intentionality 
(1999). As described in the phenomenon chapter, many patients experience their thoughts 
and experiences as coming from an external entity, as being controlled or powerless. 
Simultaneously, it is not unusual for patients to also have the sense as the self as all-
powerful and all-knowing. The self seems to be “dispersed outwards, where it fragments 
into parts that float among the things of the world: even one’s most intimate thoughts and 
inclinations may appear to emanate from some external source or mysterious foreign 
soul” (Sass, 1999). At the same time, the self may seem to have pre-eminent power to 
influence events and others. Sass illuminates the duality of this experience as paradoxical 
and incredibly mystifying, causing a chasm in the sense of self.  
 Sass invokes Foucault when discussing the resulting awareness or “hyper-
reflexivity” on one’s own consciousness becomes a preoccupation for the person (Sass, 
1999 ). The tendency to be hyper-reflexive leads to intense self-consciousness and 
alienation, in the form of turning inward and away from social life, practical activity and 
emotion (Sass, 1999). This is done, as least in large part, in response to the objective gaze 
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of psychiatry. This view of the schizophrenic condition moves away from modernist 
notions of schizophrenia as a brain disorder, whereby the brain’s function in essentially in 
decline. Madness is frequently associated with irrationality, idiosyncratic behavior, 
disordered thought and incorrect or inferior functioning in general. Schizophrenia can 
indeed display marked obscurity and contradiction, but this profound alienation, turning 
inward and anomalous thought processes are not indicative of abnormality or of a 
“broken brain” in this framework.  
Medical and biological psychiatry has minimized our ability to hear the multiple 
narratives of those suffering from these experiences and how the sense of self shifts in 
these people. The move towards medicalization has often been coined “reductionism”, 
which is the belief that many different events can be attributed to (or reduced down to) 
one main type of knowledge, namely positivism (Bracken & Thomas, 2005). In 
psychiatry, almost all aspects of human behavior, including aspects that have meaning, 
can be reduced to, attributed to, or explained by “non-meaningful” causes (Bracken & 
Thomas, 2005). For example, anxiety, worry, fears, hopes or loves can be attributed to 
genes, neurotransmitters, atoms or neurons.  While it is certainly admirable that 
biopsychosocial approaches have broadened the scope of causal entities (genes and social 
environment and ego functioning, for example), it is still a practice of categorizing in 
relation to normality. As Nelson et al. discuss, the attenuated symptoms of the prodrome 
do not place an individual at risk, rather, the underlying core of psychotic vulnerability 
signals an increased risk (2007). This vulnerability is not describable, although 
researchers have attempted to describe the phenomena of symptomology of risk, but 
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instead the expression of subjective disturbance is the crux of understanding the 
vulnerability to psychotic experience.  
Postmodern Theory of Mental Illness, Schizophrenia and the Prodrome 
What, then, are we to make of individuals suffering from what has come to be 
called mental illness, specifically schizophrenia and its prodrome? If these are not 
categorical illnesses with biological, psychological and social causes, triggers and 
components, then how shall individuals so suffering be assisted when seeking help? 
Postmodern theorists have indeed themselves been critiqued for speaking of philosophy 
and theory of mind when human beings are dealing with real and unspeakable conflict, 
suffering and pain due to the conditions or experiences that have been gathered under the 
heading of schizophrenia. To add to the confusion, it does appear that researchers have 
been successful in narrowing down the phenomena that signal the risk of developing such 
a conflicted experience (and so named the prodrome to schizophrenia). If these are only 
conceived as socially constructed categories, then are we not less compelled to intervene 
and possibly prevent such suffering? 
Ultimately, postmodern theory is a constructionist theory, proposing that indeed 
our understandings of meaning are created in practice through interpretation and 
discourse, not necessarily expressions of a priori natural conditions. This allows for 
many, multiple meanings and truths to emerge, simultaneously. One of the primary 
concerns in constructionist postmodern theory broadly is giving dominance or preference 
to any one discourse over another (Bracken & Thomas, 2005). Modernist positivism’s 
tendency to give primacy and preference to one narrative as truth is of particular concern, 
as it ignores and marginalizes other narratives. In this case, the narrative of psychosis as a 
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biological brain disorder with environmental influences is preferred to the more 
marginalized narrative of psychosis as a profound alteration of self-experience with little 
or no known etiolgy. These critiques are helpful in understanding the way that we have 
come to define and treat major mental illnesses like schizophrenia. The critiques allow us 
to conceptualize these experiences as phenomena that often arise in personal and familial 
crises and that these crises represent the individuals’ attempt to make meaning out of 
their experience. However, many postmodern or social construction approaches are 
rebuffed for being impractical and lacking in actual perspectives from those with such 
experiences. For this reason, the inclusion of subjective narratives from individuals 
themselves suffering from psychotic experience is invaluable.  
Giving space for exploring the sense of self as described by beings suffering from 
psychotic experience is an endeavor that can help to bring these neglected narratives 
forward and into the mainstream. Most diagnostic, treatment or etiological narratives 
ignore the perceptions of the sufferer. Schizophrenia, psychosis and the onset of 
symptoms interrupt “the lives of people struggling to find and create security and 
meaning in a world of contingency” (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008). Symptoms are yet 
another contingency; a “threat to human well-being that must in interpreted and 
constructively engaged” (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008). Many clinicians and researchers 
believe that people suffering from schizophrenia are doubly beset with difficulty because, 
whether a function of the illness or the person’s capacity for reflection, they often lack 
insight into their symptoms. However, such an assumption has in fact been reputed by 
many first-person narratives in which it is revealed that a person’s suffering is in fact 
exacerbated by her all-too acute self-awareness of the losses, difficulty and 
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disappointment she is experiencing as a result of her disorder (Davidson, 2003). Sass’s 
concept of “hyper-reflexivity” also endorses this notion that rather than being utterly 
unaware of their predicament, people suffering from psychosis are in fact much more 
acutely aware of the difficulty they find themselves mired in.  
Postmodern Approach to the Prodrome of Schizophrenia 
 From a social constructionist perspective, psychosis can be conceived of a 
temporary, radical and alienating experience that isolates one from shared 
communication. The person experiencing psychosis feels they are in a ‘no-man’s land’ 
where unbearable experience has no words, and therefore no voice and no authentic, real 
agency in their lives (Seikkula, 2003).  Lysacker and Lysacker are clear in pointing out 
that individuals with psychosis do not completely lose their sense of self, nor do they 
collapse entirely into self-referentiality (2008). This is apparent in their intersubjective 
experiences of being occasionally overwhelmed by experiences with other people and 
their own subjective experiences (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008). For instance, an 
individual experiencing psychosis may become distressed by an interaction with another 
person that they perceive to be threatening, in turn causing paranoia or frightening 
thoughts about the person’s intentions. They also may have subjective experiences that 
can be distressing as well, indicating that the self is maintained and is subject to 
experiences that are interpreted and perceivable.  
 Davidson conducted interviews with over one hundred individuals in different 
stages of schizophrenia or psychosis (2003). Those who were able to describe the very 
first hint of the onset of the illness described the experience in varying ways. Some 
experienced the presence of classical “positive” symptoms, namely hearing voices, 
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although this often started off in subtle forms, such as whispering or vague noises. Others 
experienced subtler changes before any hallucinations were present. However, Davidson 
concludes that nearly all the participants experienced “cognitive changes,” such as 
memory loss and confusion, concentration problems and loss of interest or ability to 
focus on things that used to interest them. They also reported increases in sensitivity to 
everyday phenomena. This sensitivity along with changes in perception, cognition, and 
attention gave participants an overwhelming sense of being distracted (2003). This 
further led to social withdrawal and isolation. Participants attempting to makes sense of 
these experiences of themselves were left so confused that they often lost their own sense 
of agency (Davidson, 2003). This process served to externalize the distressing 
phenomena of the disorder, but also continued to alienate the person from their own sense 
of agency and self (Davidson, 2003; Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008). When a person feels 
she is not in control of her own thoughts (many say hallucinations seem to come and go 
as they please), experiences of the self can feel less integrated.  
 One possible way that delusions develop in this model is that the sense of one’s 
own agency being usurped by an illness or disorder of unknown origins leaves a vacuum 
or space to be filled with some other, usually demonized and externalized being. The lack 
of personal agency is then explained by the usurping of this control by this other agent. 
Examples of such external agents vary from each individual; God, the devil, the police, 
the government, an unfriendly neighbor (Davidson, 2003). Lysacker and Lysacker further 
explicate that many reports of those having complex verbal hallucinations 
overwhelmingly have the sense that these “voices” cannot be responded to or engaged 
with (2008), once again contributing to a sense of “voicelessness.” Intrapersonal dialogue 
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is interrupted incessantly by anomalous sensory or misperceived mental phenomena, 
further disabling the person’s foundational process of self as dialogical. Hallucinations 
are essentially monologues (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008).  
 Many voices of first person narratives examine retrospectively the earliest signs 
of the struggles associated with the illness. Many of these narratives include themes of 
confusion and silence around the earliest onset of the illness. The earliest signs are often 
troubling and distressing, but a solidified language is lacking in order to give voice to 
these experiences.  This silence and lack of language is incredibly alienating for the 
individual who is already struggling with a crisis of meaning in an attempt to make sense 
of what is happening. As the person’s dialogical processes are interrupted, their ability to 
clearly conceptualize self-positions deteriorates. Without this clarity, it can become more 
difficult for a person to coherently present the appropriate self-position in interpersonal 
interactions. Further, as subclinical positive symptoms become more frequent and 
intense, the person’s ongoing intrapersonal dialogue is increasingly overwhelmed by the 
monologue of hallucinatory voices (Davidson, 2003).  
Open Dialogue Approach to Psychiatric Crisis 
 The Open Dialogue Approach is one example of clinical work with firm roots in 
postmodern theory. In this section I will discuss the history of the approach and its 
fundamental principles. This approach can be broadly applied to any psychiatric crisis or 
difficulty, but has been shown to be particularly helpful in working with families affected 
by the first psychotic episode.  The Open Dialogue Approach is an example of 
postmodern theoretical approach applied to real clinical work. Philosophically, Open 
Dialogue is grounded in narrative and phenomenological frameworks. Its ultimate goal is 
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not to change, cure, diagnose or even educate people, but to provide a space where many 
voices can be heard simultaneously speaking of the same problem.  
Roots of the Open Dialogue Approach 
 The Open Dialogue (OD) approach has its clinical roots in Northern Finland, 
where the local psychiatric hospital team noticed that recidivism was high and that 
engagement levels were low in cases where a patient was experiencing psychiatric crisis, 
often the first episode of psychotic symptoms. The clinical team there found that the 
“linguistic turn” of postmodernism and social constructionism was especially applicable 
to families in crisis, who often found themselves separated from the process of 
“treatment” and then referred to other providers, bouncing in and out of hospitals and 
acute crises. This seemingly unending process of alienation left the family more and more 
confused. The team acknowledged the discontinuity of the traditional approach, which in 
many ways reflected the families’ experience; treatment professionals were constantly in 
flux, each with different professional diagnoses and interventions (Seikkula et al., 2003). 
As the team members bounced in and out of the families’ lives, the families’ parallel 
process built mounting confusion about what could be helpful and consistent. This 
confusion, the team in Finland found, was related to the lack of language to describe the 
family’s experience.   
 As dialogism is firmly rooted in postmodern thought, it posits that intrapersonal 
and interpersonal dialogues are the core of self-experience. Open Dialogue approach, 
specifically, also owes a debt to the broad context of the double-bind theorists and family 
therapists who pioneered a communication based approach to understanding psychotic 
problems (Seikkula & Olsen, 2003). A full review of the double-bind theory and a 
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comprehensive history of family therapy’s contribution to understanding psychotic 
problems are well beyond the scope of this thesis, but these two theoretical and practical 
approaches are important to acknowledge. Double-bind theory asserts that psychotic 
problems have their origin in relational context (typically families) and begin with 
communication contexts where hallucinations and delusions are adaptive (Seikkula & 
Olsen, 2003). According to double-bind theory, conflicting and complex communication 
patterns within families can lead to the development of psychotic symptoms as a way of 
coping. For example, a family member may tell the identified patient that he is loved and 
valued, but may maintain a facial expression that communicates repulsion. Over time, the 
conflicting verbal and/or non-verbal patterns of communication can lead the person to 
respond with psychotic expressions, such as hallucinations and delusions, as a way of 
coping (Bateson et al., 1963). Expanding from this theoretical model, many models of 
family therapy attempted to untangle the paradoxes of communication and relational 
interactions contributing to psychotic problems in one family member (Seikkula & Olsen, 
2003). Open Dialogue approach, however, directly attempts to open double bind 
interactions. In Open Dialogue, psychotic expressions are seen as adaptive ways of 
coping with unbearable experiences. As we see in dialogism, often the person’s inability 
to shift among self-positions and to maintain internal and external dialogue. Social 
networks are no longer sources of dialogic shifting, but rather monologic or silenced 
communications. Beyond just solely looking at communications, the Open Dialogue 
approach to addressing double-bind interactions also examines the relationship context in 
which these communications are held, specifically by including the social network.  
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Theoretical principles of Open Dialogue 
 The theoretical principles of the Open Dialogue approach are “tolerance of 
uncertainty,” “dialogism,” and “polyphony in social networks” (Seikkula & Olson, 2003).   
Tolerance of uncertainty and dialogism are practices of language that allow many 
different narratives and perspectives to emerge. Rather than implicating one theory, 
diagnosis or treatment plan over another, this allows for open collective dialogue to 
progress. “Immediate advice, rapid conclusions and traditional interventions make it less 
likely that safety and trust will be established” (Seikkula & Olson, 2003). Safety and trust 
are of paramount importance and great attunement is given to therapeutic trust and safety. 
This often requires that treatment meetings are held on consecutive days for upwards of 
ten to twelve days following the initial meeting or crisis.  
 Theoretically, dialogism evolved from Bakhtin’s conception that human beings 
are polyphonic beings composed of distinct voices in dialogue with one another (Bakhtin, 
1984).  At times these voices can be complementary, contradictory and contrary 
(Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008). As with the phenomenological view, dialogism asserts that 
one’s sense of self is observed in feelings, thoughts, behavior and beliefs which are not a 
singular essential entity, but a multiplicity or ensemble of “selves” (Lysacker & 
Lysacker, 2008). Thus, dialogism offers a theory of the self as a complex, interactive 
collection of parts that are in constant dialogue with each other and thereby can be in 
contradiction or seeming disconnection with other parts. According to this postmodern 
position of dialogism, the self can be conceived as an ensemble of “self-positions” that 
are not organized or controlled by any overarching entity or “ego.” 
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 In this theoretical position, both the self and the world of experience are 
conceived in parallel ways as collections of multiple narratives and positions. During 
schizophrenic overwhelm, both the sense of self and the narrative of an individual’s 
experience becomes disrupted. The experience of the self and its many positions is 
distorted by the compromise in dialogism. The ability of the individual to maintain a 
relational narrative with those in his or her network is also disrupted, leading to a deeply 
isolating and alienating experience. When the individual’s dialogical relations with 
significant others and those with whom they continually have contact with are disrupted 
during psychotic experience, the individual’s capacity to experience himself as 
autonomous and having agency and voice is impaired. Both the intrapersonal and 
interpersonal experience of the self is diminished (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008).  
 If the self arises as both a dialogue between multiple self-positions (intrapersonal) 
and between the self and others (interpersonal), this is inherently a polyphonic and 
dialogical continuum of experience. Many individuals suffering from the onset of 
schizophrenia and ongoing psychosis have expressed that they experience diminishment 
and fragmentation of dialogism and polyphony. It is hypothesized that organization of the 
multiple selves or self-positions is impaired when schizophrenic disordering appears.  
Practice Principles  
The following are the seven main principles of the Open Dialogue Approach in practice: 
Immediate help/intervention  
 Immediate intervention is a key concept in the OD approach. The clinician 
receiving the first contact with the family arranges the first meeting within twenty- four 
hours.  Twenty-four hour crisis services are available in the Western Lapland and have 
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been in existence since 1992. The team may meet many times during the initial crisis; the 
team frequently anticipates meeting daily for ten to twelve days during the acute crisis 
period (Seikkula, 2003). 
Social-network perspective  
 Social networks refer to caring personal communities for support and 
collaboration, reflecting the way people really live their lives in a postmodern society 
(Seikkula et al., 2003). People’s subjective experiences are encompassed in their social 
networks, not merely within a framework of symptomology in contrast to normality. 
Families and networks are greatly impacted by the subjective psychotic experience of one 
of their members. These social networks are made up of people from a clients’ personal 
network, which can pose a challenge to traditional or conventional expertise of clinical 
professionals. This challenge is precisely the move that OD intends, as the gaze of 
professionals and the acts of identifying the problem within the family or network and 
seeking to change the problem is one that is alienating and shows preference for the 
metanarrative of the professionals. As Seikkula (2003) and his colleagues state,  
opening doors for families to participate in analyzing the problem, preparing a 
treatment plan, and participating in treatment meetings throughout the entire 
treatment sequence were the first steps in seeing all the problems as problems in 
the actual social situation of the patient (p. 190).  
Flexibility and mobility 
 The treatment response is adapted to the needs and presenting concerns of the 
family. For instance, treatment meetings may be scheduled at the family’s home, if 
consented by the family (Seikkula et al., 2003). During a crisis phase or acute 
presentation, no exact plans for future treatment are made by the clinicians, rather the 
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team is focused on opening the dialogue with the family on a continuous basis. After the 
crisis has calmed, treatment methods and interventions are chosen based on the family’s 
values and input and on the patient’s problems, preconditions and needs (Seikkula, 2003).  
Responsibility 
 The first staff member that receives contact regarding the referral, whether it is 
with the patient, a family member or relative or another referring agency, is responsible 
for scheduling the first team meeting. The entire treatment team takes charge and 
participates in the whole treatment process (Seikkula, 2003; Seikkula et al., 2003).  
Psychological continuity 
 The team of clinicians present at the first team meeting remains involved with the 
case for the entire duration of treatment. This team takes responsibility for treatment as 
long as necessary in both inpatient and outpatient settings. Members of the patient’s 
social network are also invited to participate in every meeting. The team also anticipates 
that the treatment of an acute psychotic crisis can require between two and three years 
and the team commits to this time period with the patient with his or her social network 
(Seikkula, 2003).  
Tolerance of uncertainty 
 One of the unique elements of the OD approach is the intentional avoidance of 
hasty decisions, premature treatment choices and diagnoses. This is part of inviting a 
sense of safety and security, which in turn allows for a dialogue to form. As a routine part 
of each team meeting, participants discuss whether and when the next meeting will take 
place. Tolerating uncertainty in diagnosis, treatment and interventions is an active 
attitude of the therapists who attempt to engage with the family and network to form a 
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joint process (Seikkula, 2003). This is a departure from many treatment team decisions in 
inpatient or crisis interventions where the focus is on the professionals rapidly deciding 
on a diagnosis and treatment plan, which is then presented to the patient and the family.  
Dialogism 
  The principle of dialogism, which is discussed at length above, when put into 
clinical practice maintains that the focus of the treatment team is to promote dialogue 
with the family. Focusing on change in the patient or the family is of secondary concern. 
The dialogic conversation is a forum where families and patients have the chance to 
increase and voice their sense of agency. The primary focus is on allowing a new 
understanding of the problem to be built by holding a dialogue in following the themes, 
language and way of speaking that the family is used to (Seikkula, 2003).  
 Research on the Open Dialogue approach indicates that it greatly decreases the 
need for long-term and repeated hospitalizations, as well as decreases the need for the use 
of neuroleptic medication. In an initial study of first episode psychosis, the model was 
shown to improve outcomes by reducing recidivism, use of medication and the incidence 
of hospitalization (Seikkula & Olsen, 2003).  In a two-year follow up study of the OD 
approach in outpatient settings for first-episode psychosis in Northern Finland, the OD 
group had few relapses, shorter hospital stays, few residual psychotic symptoms and few 
cases of neuroleptic medication prescription (Seikkula et al., 2003). This study was not a 
randomly assigned, double blind study, so there are methodological limitations. But 
compared to treatment as usual, better outcomes were noted and the Finnish program 
continues to be employed as a first-line approach to first episode psychosis. The model is 
also being used in acute care settings in much of Scandinavia and Russia (Seikkula & 
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Olsen, 2003). The studies done in Finland have samples that are quite small and 
homogenous, which the researchers concede is a limitation. Seikkula notes that while the 
sample size and makeup are limitations, the strength of this systemic shift in the Western 
Lapland region of Northern Finland has been a comprehensive, flexible and responsive 
mental health response to psychiatric crisis. Duration of untreated psychosis declined to 
3.6 months (Seikkula, 2003).  
Application to the Case of James 
 From a broad postmodern perspective, it is helpful to conceptualize the case as 
James’ narrative. Immediately, we find ourselves in the predicament that the story is 
written in the third person past tense. Furthermore, the narrative is recorded by a clinical 
researcher, who is attempting to distill James’ experience into a diagnostic framework for 
the purpose of educating other researchers and clinicians. She asks James questions and 
takes his history from his mother. This serves to distance the reader from the subjective 
narrative and also diminishes our sense of James’ voice. If we were to only take what 
first person statements James is recorded making, we would have almost no coherent 
narrative at all.   
 Despite the flawed nature of the case’s recording, I will first take up the project of 
the specific ways we are shown that James’ narrative is silenced and his sense of self 
disrupted by his anomalous sensory and perceptual experiences. At first, we discover that 
James initial difficulty appears to have begun over the summer when he was 15 years old. 
However, we quickly learn, apparently from his mother, that he has always been 
somewhat shy and awkward, although he was “an easier baby” than his brother. We find 
that James was affectionate and loving. Also, we learn that James was assessed to have 
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difficulty with inattention, but this is vaguely described. Since we know from dialogical 
and narrative theories that the self develops in dialogic relation to others and as a 
narrative between the multiple self positions we occupy, we can assume that part of 
James interpersonal dialogue between himself and others (mother, teachers, sibling) 
would have included this sense that he was shy, awkward and inattentive. Therefore it is 
likely that James developed the self-positions of self-as-shy, self-as-awkward, self-as- 
inattentive. These self-positions likely interacted with other varying self-positions and 
possibly contradicted his positions as self-as-loving, self-as-affectionate. Other possible 
self-positions, which we do not have the privilege of exploring because we do not hear 
directly from James regarding his sense of self, include, self-as-son-of-psychotic or self-
as-different.  
 When describing his experience more recently, James states to the interviewer 
that he perceives others to be looking at him as though he is “weird or menacing.” This 
could signal James’ sense of himself as including these self positions of weird and 
menacing, but could also be related to his self-position and identity as a black male in an 
inner city. The very real experiences of people of color being marginalized in their 
communities frequently occurs in subtle ways such as glances, looks, comments and 
other microaggressions. In many cases, people of color experience “paranoia” that is 
warranted, as they are the target of these microaggressions. Since people from the 
dominant culture are seldom consciously aware of these microaggressions, the person of 
color could be labeled as paranoid. To internalize this experience is to have an 
intrapersonal dialogue that is quite disparate from one’s interpersonal dialogue, causing 
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rifts in one’s self-position and clarity of one’s own capacity to choose and have agency 
over sense of self.  
 James is also having anomalous sensory and perceptual experiences. These 
profoundly frightening and alienating experiences have left him feeling diminished and 
different from his peers. He acknowledged that he prefers to be by himself, feeling 
uncomfortable around others. His sense of himself as different from his friends has led 
him to the conclusion that they do not like him anymore.  When he returns from South 
Carolina to New York City, he states the city seems smellier, louder and dirtier than 
before. James may be hypersensitive to sensory experiences as a result of his nascent 
sense that he is different and becoming more disconnected with that which was familiar. 
It is not likely that NYC is any different, but it could be part of James’ growing sense of 
isolation and alienation- the city he grew up in and calls home is now even rejecting him, 
while he feels disgusted by it. It may be especially evident that the city that he has lived 
in his whole life is much dirtier, louder and smellier relative to his experience in South 
Carolina. 
 James’ profound sense of isolation, alienation and confusion about his own 
agency is vividly captured when he describes sitting alone and being found by a janitor, 
unable to explain why he was there. This image of him, alone, silent and motionless is a 
visual and experiential entryway into how James’ sense of self has been impaired by his 
psychological, social and emotional experiences. The Open Dialogue approach would 
point to this experience as the crux of a psychiatric emergency. The patient is having such 
an utterly frightening and unbearably isolating event happen to them that they feel and 
experience a very real loss of agency.  We see this again captured in James’ difficulty in 
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school; he cannot write an essay. He can barely get past the first sentence. In order to be 
the author of a written work, one must have a sense of oneself as an agent with voice and 
some narrative to tell. We see James’ ongoing sense that he has lost his voice and agency 
in his own life symbolized by his near paralysis in attempting to author a written 
narrative.  
 James attempts to make some sense of his frightening sensory events and his own 
loss of power, voice and agency. He begins to react to this by withdrawing from settings 
where interpersonal dialogue is necessary, such as school and with peer, social situations 
and his family. He questions whether his friends even like him anymore. It is widely 
know that stigma strongly impacts people’s perceptions of those with “mental illness” 
and those suffering with these illnesses feel demoralized, as these stereotypes are 
internalized (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008).  
 Firstly, in a conventional modernist model of treatment or assessment, it may be 
that James and his family would have to be on a waiting list in order to get into a clinic 
for consultation. In most traditional medical models, after presenting for psychiatric 
consultation, the clinicians involved would make diagnosing and assessment the 
immediate goal. Many questions would be asked in order to illicit from James and his 
mother whether James has symptoms that fit into any of the categories that these 
clinicians diagnose and treat. These questions would often be specific and close-ended, as 
the clinicians attempt to narrow James’ presenting concerns into categories; does he have 
anxiety, depressive symptom, negative symptoms of psychosis, how strong are his 
convictions about his perceptual and sensory experiences? Does James have cognitive 
disabilities? During this process, James would be subjected to the calm, objective gaze of 
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the assessing clinicians. Once a diagnosis was agreed upon by the clinicians, they would 
present this to the family, along with treatment recommendations. Typically, first –line 
treatment for any of the conditions in question in James’ case would include 
psychoeducation for James and his family, psychotherapy, likely from a cognitive 
behavioral framework and medication to address anxiety symptoms, depressive 
symptoms and psychotic symptoms.  
 In contrast, using dialogical theory as the framework would understand James’ 
predicament in terms of dialogical compromises leading to experiences of self-
diminishment (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008). In Open Dialogue, one of the ways to 
understand and redress these compromises is to provide a structured yet safe space for 
dialogue to re-emerge and to mend interpersonal dialogism. This is initiated by providing 
immediate help in the form of the first team meeting. The patient and his family do not 
get put on a waiting list, rather the initial meeting is schedule as soon after the first 
contact is made as possible. Further, the patient’s social network is invited to this and 
every meeting thereafter. In the instance of James, his mother, brother, teachers, friends 
and any other relatives or people involved in his life would be asked to attend. During the 
first meeting, the clinicians would invoke a sense of safety by establishing that meetings 
will be held as frequently as necessary during the initial emergency. The focus of the 
team meetings is not to rapidly diagnose and treat, but rather to establish rapport and 
dialogue with the family. This is done by listening to the family and using their own 
language to communicate about the problem as they see it. Each family member is 
invited to speak about his or her sense of the problem.  
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 James’ social network would also experience the clinical team’s tolerance of 
uncertainty. Rather than jumping to conclusions and making assessments and presenting 
them to the family and patient, the clinicians become fully immersed in the task of 
developing dialogue with the network. While uncertainty can indeed cause anxiety when 
safety is of concern or when family members are highly distressed, this is often assuaged 
by meeting every day until the initial crisis calms. This can greatly increase the networks’ 
sense that they are being heard and the patient’s sense that he is not alone. Allowing for a 
polyphony of voices can be comforting to the patient, as it increases the likelihood of 
dialogue and invites agency on the part of the patient. Further, since the polyphony takes 
place in a safe environment and within the patient’s own network, it is much less 
disturbing that the “caucophony” that many patients with psychosis abhor and become 
overwhelmed by (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008).  
 As the OD approach is network and language based, it is also need-adapted 
(Seikkula & Olsen, 2003), which means that James’ need within the context of his social 
network would be constantly and flexibly addressed.  Therefore, all of the dialogical 
aspects are met in this model; the need for voice, agency, response to a person’s changing 
sense of self and needs and the interpersonal context that a person’s sense of self 
develops.  
 The Open Dialogue approach can strike us as unusual or unstructured because it 
does not seem to imply a systematic treatment intervention. However, the team meetings 
serve as the ongoing treatment. The treatment principles outlined above continue to guide 
the team’s approach with the family. This does not bar members of the team or the social 
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network from requesting or implementing other treatment methods, including the use of 




CHAPTER SIX  
DISCUSSION 
 In this chapter, I will begin by grounding the discussion of the two theoretical 
perspectives relative to the prodrome in each theory’s concept of humanity and self-
experience. I will then discuss the core components of automatic thoughts, core beliefs 
and cognitive distortions from cognitive theory as they apply to the prodrome. Next, I 
will discuss the components of dialogical process, sense of self and loss of agency/voice 
from postmodern dialogical theory applied to the prodrome. I will provide an in depth 
discussion of the contrasting elements of the two theoretical approaches to the prodrome, 
and will then move into the ways the two theories can be taken together to give us a new 
understanding of the phenomenon of the prodrome.  
Cognitive Theoretical Concept of Self-Experience 
 Cognitive theory begins with the assumption that human beings’ primary function 
is to process information (Beck, 2009). Information is processed by making internal 
representations of sensory experience of both external and internal events. Humans make 
mental representations of all of their experiences. Accordingly, when formulating 
responses to their experiences, people do not respond directly to the actual experience, 
rather they respond to their mental representation of it (Clark, 2009). Human beings are 
constantly involved and engaged in a perception-interpretation process. The result of this 
process is affective, behavioral and physiological responses, which can either be positive 
and adaptive, or negative and maladaptive (Clark, 2009). Thus, human beings experience 
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themselves as well adapted and as coping well when their information processing is 
unencumbered by cognitive distortions and maladaptive beliefs.   
 If we begin with this position on self-experience, according to cognitive theory, it 
then follows that healthy humans process information with efficiency and functionality 
allowing them to progress without undue distress or suffering in relation to their mental 
representations. As can be the case when examining the essence of humanity in the 
context of psychopathology, we often understand what health is in comparison to disease. 
In cognitive theory, psychological disease or pathology is related almost ubiquitously to 
disturbances to the information processing system for an individual. Psychological 
disturbances can be characterized by excessive or deficient stimulation of the systems 
responsible for beliefs or attitudes (Clark, 2009).   
 The cognitive model of the prodrome asserts that the core symptoms are derived 
from basic disturbances in information processing causing vulnerable individuals to slip 
into decline that is difficult to halt. These disturbances lead to perceptual abnormalities 
and disturbances of the experience of the self (Nelson & Yung, 2008). These perceptions 
lead to interpretations that have consequences in the ways individuals behave and feel. 
Cognitively oriented interventions are aimed at redressing and restructuring the 
information processing system. Overly maladaptive or negative perception-interpretation 
processes are examined and ultimately challenged in favor of more positive or adaptive 
ones.  
Schemas and Cognitive Distortions 
 The foundational components of cognitive structures are called schemas. Schemas 
are pervasive internal representations of stimuli, ideas, and sensory experiences that 
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organize, filter and integrate information so that a person can find meaning in phenomena 
(Clark, 2009). Schemas are essentially the cognitive bridge between perception of an 
event and the interpretation of the event. Schemas are activated by any life event, 
regardless of its origin (pathological or otherwise). When a person’s foundational 
schemas are maladaptive or negative, information processing is biased from the outset. 
This results in cognitive distortions.  
 Beck and many cognitive theorists believe that a great deal of psychopathology is 
based on cognitive distortions. Distortions of thought are based on erroneous thinking 
that is often derived from early learning experiences. These erroneous thought patterns 
create long-term cognitive biases and inaccurate appraisals of both external and internal 
stimuli, leading to the development of schemas. Schemas are long running patterns of 
thought. Our interpretations of experiences are greatly influenced by our schemas 
because schemas are unconscious foundational filters through which information is 
processed. Part of cognitive-behavioral therapy is illuminating this process and 
challenging beliefs that are maladaptive or unhelpful. In this capacity, cognitively 
oriented therapy does involve giving language to previously unstated parts of human 
experience, namely unconscious thought patterns, schemas and beliefs. Schematic 
organization in prodromal individuals is thought to contain enduring representations of 
the self, others and the world that are “negative.” This is the foundation for cognitive 
vulnerability to prodromal syndromes.  
Core Beliefs 
 Schematic orientations lead to core beliefs. An underlying schematic orientation 
with tendencies towards externalization and views of the self as helpless or easily 
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compromised lead to core beliefs such as “I am vulnerable” or “Others cannot be trusted” 
(Morrison, 2008). Cognitive researchers maintain that core beliefs play a significant role 
in the onset and escalation of psychotic symptoms. Negative beliefs about the self, the 
world and others are associated with psychosis (Morrison, 2008). How a person appraises 
psychotic phenomena tremendously impacts how the person responds to these 
experiences. People appraise situations based on their schematic orientation. When an 
individual interprets mental representations with core beliefs, they often come up with 
thoughts to characterize the core belief. For example, if the prodromal experience is 
subclinical audio hallucinations and the core belief is “others cannot be trusted,” the 
thought associated may be “people at work are gossiping about me.” This thought can 
lead to a feeling of paranoia, distress, anxiety, and anger, etcetera. It can also lead to 
behavioral changes, such as social isolation. Delusional thinking in Ultra-High Risk 
(UHR) individuals can be understood as an attempt to explain unusual internal 
psychological states. As the person continues to have unusual internal experiences, they 
continue to gather evidence aligned with the belief they have chosen to understand these 
experiences.  
 In cognitively oriented treatment, core beliefs can be evaluated and changed 
through cognitive-behavioral techniques such as gathering evidence for and against the 
belief, generating a list of advantages and disadvantages to a particular belief, and 
generating alternative beliefs (Morrison, 2008).  It should also be mentioned that core 
beliefs may not always be negative. For instance, many people whose schemas include 
self-vulnerability and fear of others conclude that paranoia is a positive experience, 
because it serves to keep them safe. Therefore, paranoia (i.e. “I must always be on 
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guard”) as a core belief can be a positive reinforcing cognitive experience for some 
(Morrison, 2008). Another example of positive psychotic-like experiences is social 
withdrawal. Based on their core beliefs, many people are lead to paucity of speech, social 
withdrawal and disengagement (Beck, 2004). The belief that disengaging with social 
interaction (i.e. negative symptomatology) can assuage difficulty based distorted beliefs 
about the self, others or the world. This can contribute to the cycle of information 
processing and schizophrenic-like behavior and feeling patterns.  
 In prodromal syndromes, delusions are often not entirely or fully formed, hence 
they are deemed subclinical, attenuated or brief. This makes sense within a cognitive 
paradigm, given that a prodromal person can begin to have suspicions that are not 
grounded in reality, but these thoughts or beliefs may not be entirely “hard.” This can 
mean that the beliefs are open to reality testing or malleable. During the prodromal phase, 
a  process whereby individuals undergo psychosocial stress in combination with already 
present cognitive vulnerabilities combine to cause symptoms that range from well below 
psychotic level to brief periods of fully psychotic symptoms (Bebbington & Kuipers, 
2008).  Adverse experiences can combine with pre-existing core beliefs about the self, 
the world and other people in the world to form delusional beliefs. As stated by 
Bebbington & Kuipeers (2008), pre-existing vulnerabilities 
triggered by stresses such as negative life events or negative relationships, 
individuals may experience and increasing cascade of cognitive and perceptual 
anomalies that, together with emotional reactions, lead them to conclude not that 
this is a ‘bad day,’ but that external agents are conspiring against them. (p. 78) 
Recovering from episodes of psychosocial stress activating cognitive schemas and core 
beliefs that are prone towards externalizing of adverse events is highly dependent on the 
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individuals’ capacities for cognitive coping. Often, in individuals who are prodromal, 
such coping skills are absent.  As we will see in the following section on automatic 
thoughts, this is intertwined with an externalizing bias.  
Automatic Thoughts 
 According to cognitive theory, automatic thoughts are the products of a biased 
information-processing system (Clark, 2009). This information processing system rests 
on the foundation of schema and core beliefs about the self and others. All experiences 
and stimuli are filtered through these unconscious or rarely noticed cognitive structures. 
The results are almost always automatic thoughts.  Automatic thoughts (or images) are 
specific to current circumstances and are involuntary and temporary mental 
representations of a person’s current affective state. These thoughts or images are 
typically plausible or realistic in current circumstances, meaning that they are not 
frequently so bizarre that they cannot be reconciled with the person’s current concerns 
and schemas (Beck, 2009; Clark, 2009). However, in people who are cognitively 
vulnerable, perceptions may be biased, which can in turn cause highly biased negative 
automatic thoughts. Most often, an individual is not acutely aware of their automatic 
thoughts. Automatic thoughts are usually a primary object of cognitive interventions. 
Repeatedly illuminating automatic thoughts and their impact on behavioral, affective and 
physiological responses is a way that cognitive therapists attempt to modify dysfunctional 
underlying schemas and core beliefs (Clark, 2009).  
 Cognitive theory posits that hallucinations are in fact an externalized version of 
the “inner voice” stream of thoughts that are present for most people (Beck et al., 2009). 
In cognitive theory, thoughts are first person experiences (e.g. “I am a loser”). These 
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thoughts can translate into a voice, which is a second person representation of the thought 
(e.g. “You are a loser”).  Often in psychosis, these translated thoughts are heard as third 
person accusations directed at the individual suffering from psychotic experience (Beck 
et al., 2009).  For those who are cognitively vulnerable to psychotic patterns of 
experience, automatic thoughts play a very salient role in the development of prodromal 
symptoms. Individuals prone to prodromal syndromes have cognitive structures such that 
they perceive intrusive thoughts to be personally relevant and therefore requiring 
response (Clark, 2009).  
 Beck et al. assert that the content of automatic thoughts play a significant role in 
the exacerbation of hallucinations (2009). The process of the inner dialogue being 
externalized into voices, hallucinations or delusions is related to a specific cognitive 
vulnerability known as an externalizing bias (Beck et al., 2009; Clark, 2004). UHR 
individuals are often prone to an externalizing bias. This externalizing bias leads those at 
risk to have the sense that the input they are detecting has come from an external source, 
rather than from their own thoughts or internal processes. It is typical of prodromal 
individuals to have a pre-existing attributional style that tends to attribute negative 
experiences to an external cause (Beck et al., 2009). This fundamental bias contributes to 
the development of prodromal symptomatology, as many young adolescents have 
negative automatic thoughts and psychotic-like experiences, but UHR individuals are 
more prone to externalizing these thoughts (Beck et al., 2009).  
Postmodern Theory’s Concept of Self-Experience 
 Postmodernist thought is, generally speaking, suspicious of what can be called 
“meta-narratives.” As mentioned in the previous chapter, meta-narratives are theories or 
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ways of knowing that make claims to truth above other ways of knowing. This is often 
referred to as the linguistic or narrative “turn”, which refers to the paradigmatic shift in 
the way we conceptualize our experience of the world, our selves and other beings. This 
shift has at its root the idea that our lives and experiences cannot be distilled down to 
biological, genetic, neurological, psychological or any other singular theory.  
 Based on the linguistic or narrative turn, dialogism honors that people are 
comprised of multiple different parts all in continual dialogue with each other. Further, 
the theory also brings to light that all forms of communication, spoken or unspoken, are 
always a response to interpersonal and or intrapersonal interactions. The fundamental 
conceptualization of human nature is the notion that each being occupies multiple selves 
or self-positions that are in constant internal dialogue with each other. As Lysacker and 
Lysacker, 2008, aptly describe, “we sense ourselves within and through encounters that 
are at once intra- and interpersonal, and that reflect complementary and dissonant facets 
of our being. [S]elf-positions are axes of self-world interaction, more a matter of who we 
are, than of whom we take ourselves to be” (p.34). A continuous and ordered series of 
shifts in our multiple self-positions relative to relationships, situations and experiences 
reveals itself to us through the process of intra- and interpersonal dialogue. While this 
process is a complex and dynamic interplay, it remains ordered as a response to worldly 
interactions and coherent internal experience.  The most basic concept of self-experience 
is that people are in constant dialogue with others and within the individual his or herself.  
 An ordered and comprehensible process is necessary for the above to occur, 
which of course presumes a person has the capacity for such order. While all humans, 
according to dialogism, must engage in the dialogical process (both inter- and 
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intrapersonal), the theory also assumes that this process will be mostly unencumbered. 
Dialogism does allow for dissonance, contradiction, confusion and complexity among 
self-positions. However, the process of dialogue is still the crux of self-experience and 
this must be a relatively uninterrupted and ordered process in order for a healthy sense of 
oneself. This theoretical perspective, while much less apt to label interrupted dialogical 
processes as “diseased” or “disordered” and to diagnose this as mental illness, still has at 
its root a notion of health and order in self-experience.   
Dialogical Process 
 Dialogism offers a theory of the self as a complex, interactive collection of parts 
that are in constant dialogue with each other. Because human experience is a complex 
multiplicity of many different experiences, the parts that make up a person can be in 
contradiction or seeming disconnection with each other. According to the postmodern 
position of dialogism, the self can be conceived as an ensemble of “self-positions” that 
are not organized or controlled by any overarching entity or “ego” (Bahktin,1984; 
Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008). The self can be conceived as a continuous flux of self-
positions; for example, self-as-brother, self-as-African-American, self-as-anxious. Each 
“part” of the self can be conceived of as a different self-position that constantly is in 
intra-personal communication with other self-positions, depending on various life events 
and interpersonal communications. The self-positions shift in relation to each other as 
well.  Every person’s self-positions flux in and out of prominence in the person’s overall 
sense of himself. Further, a person’s multiple self-positions are in dialogue with each 
other, which allows for even contradicting self-positions to co-exist (Lysacker & 
Lysacker, 2008).  
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 Open Dialogue addresses the disruption of interpersonal and intrapersonal 
dialogue by utilizing a language-based intervention for families with psychotic problems. 
The person suffering from psychotic symptoms is invited to speak about their experiences 
without judgment, hasty diagnoses or professional opinions. This is all accomplished 
within the context of the person’s social network. The inclusion of the network serves to 
address the disruption in the interpersonal dialogical process by bringing the individuals’ 
closest relationships into a communication-based setting and providing permission for 
each person to conceptualize the nature of the problem in his own words.   
Sense of Self 
 It is widely known that psychosis and schizophrenia changes how people think 
about and experience themselves as individual human beings in the world (Davidson, 
2003; Lysacker, Glynn, Wilkniss, & Silverstein, 2010; Lysacker & Lysacker, 2002).  In 
fact, even the earliest pioneers in schizophrenia research and literature, Eugen Bleuler 
and Emil Kraeplin, acknowledged that a fundamental alteration of the self-experience 
was a hallmark of schizophrenic experience (Lysacker et al., 2001). The changes in 
process of making meaning, activities and processes that order the multiple selves face 
diminishment during the prodrome. Changes in the processes that order the self were 
cited as some of the primary difficulties in schizophrenia as early as the beginning of the 
last century (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2002). The changes in these processes have largely 
been ignored or conceptualized as secondary to biological and neurological disorder 
within the biopsychosocial model.  
 There is evidence to suggest that the sense of self is diminished in a similar way 
during the prodrome as it is during psychosis (Nelson et al., 2007). We also know that 
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self-esteem is greatly impacted during most experiences with psychopathology and 
negative experience of the self can contribute to ongoing difficulty in a number of 
psychological problems (Beck, 2009). The collapse of coherent self-experience during 
the prodrome may in fact signal the very first experience of sense of self being altered, 
yet negative self-concept and an underlying sense of vulnerability may contribute to the 
increasing sense of altered self (Nelson et al., 2007).  From a narrative postmodern 
perspective, this collapse of self-awareness or altered sense of one’s own self reflects an 
impoverished self-narrative (Lysacker, Glynn, Wilkniss, & Silverstein, 2010), which in 
turn leads prodromal individuals to continue to experience themselves as diminished. The 
self-narrative or self in dialogue with itself and others can be disrupted in potentially 
three ways during the prodrome.  
 First, instead of experiencing the self as a coherent dialogue, ongoing 
conversations within the self and others can be drowned out by one or two dominant and 
loud self-positions of voices (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2002; Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008). 
It is typical for a self-position to shift into dominance and for one to experience open and 
continuous dialogues between separate and often opposing elements. These elements do 
flow in a hierarchical fashion, the order and dominance of the self-positions routinely 
shifting, allowing for the dialogue to consistently continue. During the prodrome, it is 
indeed possible that the ordering and reordering of the hierarchy is disrupted in such a 
way that internal dialogue is captured or dominated by one or two self-positions. It is 
possible that the ever-shifting hierarchy ceases its shifting and becomes rigid (Lysacker 
& Lysacker, 2002). This experience in the prodrome can be known as the monological 
self, whereby the prodromal individual comes to only experience himself in one or two 
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fixed self-positions.  This self-experience can be correlated to those with significant 
positive symptoms, whereby the “voices” of hallucinations and delusions are the 
overriding and dominant self-positions.  
 The second possible disruption of self-experience in the prodrome is known as the 
cacophonous self. This involves the break down of the hierarchy of self-positions in such 
a way where no coherent dialogue can be perceived, leaving the prodromal to embrace a 
cacophony of self-positions. The internal dialogue of the cacophonous self is rich with 
voices and self-positions, however, they lack coherence, connection and hierarchy of any 
kind, which in turn leads to inaccessibility of dialogue with others (Lysacker & Lysacker, 
2002).  This can also lead to anguish with the prodromal person, given that the self 
appears to be dissolved into an incoherent, disorderly and unsettling collection of 
unrelated self-positions. This self-experience could be associated with individuals who 
have disorganized thought patterns, difficulty with concentration or decline in social 
functioning.  
 Thirdly, an empty or “barren” sense of self could be capitulated if dialogue itself 
became suspended. With only the bare minimum of self-positions available, the person 
feels virtually useless to develop or continue intrapersonal or interpersonal dialogue. The 
lack of or suspension of the self-narrative can lead to a prodromal individual’s sense that 
they lack any capacity for dialogism at all. This could be associated with negative 
symptoms, social withdrawal, avolition and anhedonia.  
 The sense of self or self-experienced is almost always altered or changed in some 
way during the prodrome. Above, I have explored a few ways this might occur. Below I 
will discuss the ways that these self-experiences relates to the clinical presentation of 
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prodromal phenomena and how this relates to the cognitive understanding of the 
prodrome.  
Loss of Agency/Voice  
 Conceptually, psychosis and schizophrenic-like illness in dialogic theory is a 
profoundly frightening experience during which a person loses her ability to describe the 
experience and feels a distinct inability to act in response to this experience (Seikkula, 
2003).  As we know from dialogic theory, a person experiences themselves most fully 
when he or she is able to engage in an ever-shifting internal dialogue between multiple 
selves and external dialogue between other people and experiences in their world. During 
psychosis, the person loses the ability to respond quite frequently within the context of 
relational dialogues, both within social networks and internally (Bateson et al., 1963; 
Seikkula, 2003). The self is experienced at its fullest when the capacity for dialogic 
response is present. It has been theorized by some postmodern thinkers and Open 
Dialogue researchers and practitioners that loss of the ability to respond is a primary 
hallmark of the psychotic experience. As described above, the internal dialogue is 
thwarted in any number of ways during the prodrome; by the barren, monological or 
cacophonous self-experiences characteristic of the prodrome.  One of the consequences 
of the self-experience being diminished in the prodromal phase is that a prodromal 
individual experiences a real loss of agency. Loss of agency can be characterized by a 
loss of the capacity to act, speak and/or respond to the events and experiences of one’s 
own life. In the prodromal phase this is often experienced as a loss of voice. The loss of 
voice is characterized by the lack of everyday language to describe what is happening to 
the person. As Seikkula et al. describe it, psychosis can be seen as “one way to deal with 
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experiences so terrifying they can only be expressed though the language of 
hallucinations and delusions” (p. 191). In many ways, hallucinatory and delusional 
communications and utterances are a person’s active attempt to make sense of what is 
happening to them. During the prodrome, these first frightening experiences are often 
understated, intermittent or overshadowed by a decline in social functioning. 
Nevertheless, changes occur during this period, most of which are outside of previous 
experience and words.  
 The main task of the dialogue in OD is to construct a new language for the 
difficult experiences of the patient and those in his or her network (Seikkula et al., 2003). 
These experiences typically have not yet been given language or words that the patient 
and the social network can use to make meaning and comprehend the incredible 
frightening experiences occurring in the prodrome. OD is a language-based approach 
(Seikkula & Olsen, 2003), which is a reflection of the crucial necessity of language in 
order for prodromal to recapture a sense of agency. Within the dialogic framework, 
rebuilding the capacity for voice and responsiveness to internal and external dialogue can 
be the best way to address this aspect of the prodrome.  
Contrasting principles: Critiques Using Dialogism and Cognitive Theories 
 When returning to the clinical phenomena of the prodrome based on the review of 
the literature, it is crucial to realize that research has shifted over time. The prodrome is 
conceived now to be a set of factors that signals increased risk for the onset of psychosis. 
When these risk factors are present and an individual experiences stress or other events 
that may cause psychotic symptoms in a more general population sample, prodromal 
individuals are more likely to remain in a pervasive psychotic state. As discussed above, 
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cognitive theorists often cite the fact that psychotic experiences are actually more 
common than widely believed (Clark, 2009; Beck, 2004). Cognitive theory asserts, based 
on the stress-diathesis model, that under circumstances that may cause severe stress, 
underlying cognitive vulnerabilities will be triggered and maladaptive patterns will 
emerge. This in fact fits nicely with the prodrome’s phenomena; that it can be a time of 
attenuated symptoms, but more accurately reflects an underlying proclivity towards 
pervasive psychotic patterns of thinking, acting, feeling and interacting. These patterns 
emerge as subclinical symptoms, brief symptoms, social or functional decline in the 
prodrome. Cognitively oriented therapy interventions have the goals of; 1) managing 
existing symptoms, psychotic, depressive, anxiety and any other co-occurring 
psychopathology, including substance abuse and 2) preventing the possible conversion 
into frank psychosis (Auther et al.,2008; Jackson, McGorry, & Edwards, 2001).  
 We can conceive of the prodrome as both a clinical phenomenon unto itself and 
yet inextricably connected to psychosis. The prodrome is a distinct clinical entity, as it is 
a different set of symptoms and clinical presentations than frank psychosis of 
schizophrenia. However, without definitions or common understandings of psychosis and 
schizophrenic illness, it is impossible to conceive the prodrome as separate entirely from 
these phenomena. The prodrome signals risk for psychosis and also shares features, 
symptoms and patterns with psychosis. In general, prodromal research has been 
dominated by the medical psychiatry and biopsychosocial models.   
 One critique that dialogic theory would have of cognitive theory would be in the 
fundamental idea that a person’s thoughts can be “erroneous.” This notion implies the 
modernist conception of “health versus disease” or “right versus wrong”; namely that 
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there is a healthy way to think or a right way to think and this is contrasted with 
unhealthy or maladaptive ways of thinking. This is particularly poignant in examining the 
long-term existent schemas of individuals who suffer from prodromal experiences. Many 
of these experiences are profoundly disturbing and frightening; however, a person’s 
premorbid functioning often plays a significant role in how they are able to cope with 
such experiences (Jackson, McGorry, & Edwards, 2001). Cognitive theory offers that a 
person’s distress in the face of psychotic symptoms and experience is real and often 
exacerbated by their pre-existing schemas, thoughts, and self-references. Dialogism 
would add that because these thoughts and schemas are automatic and rarely discussed in 
everyday life, there is a lack of language with which to describe and relate to these 
experiences. Describing and relating our experiences to others and to all of our multiple 
self-positions is crucial in the dialogical process. It is also crucial to the dialogic principle 
of polyphony and tolerance of uncertainty, in which labeling ways of being as 
“maladaptive” would be seen as unhelpful, stigmatizing and disruptive of dialogic 
processes. There is growing evidence the supports the idea that stigma and negative 
expectations themselves are enough to contribute to worse outcomes in psychotic clients 
and those attempting to recover from the first psychotic episode (Lysacker, Glynn, 
Wilkniss, & Silverstein, 2010).  
 OD addresses the dialogical nature of human beings by utilizing a social network 
perspective. The social network includes those who are nearest to the patient (Seikkula et 
al., 2003).  OD openly acknowledges that the self is a polyphony of self-positions and 
voices from those in our social network. While tolerance of uncertainty and the social 
network are believed to be highly helpful in developing a new language-based solution to 
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the problem of prodromal psychosis, cognitive theory would critique this on the grounds 
that OD does not go far enough to mend the foundational vulnerabilities that led to the 
onset of the problem. For instance, redressing cognitive distortions and underlying 
schema that led a person like James to believe that he was be glanced at menacingly by 
folks in his neighborhood might include exploring his experience of internalized racism, 
leading to feelings of vulnerability and fear. CBT would work with James to address the 
underlying beliefs and choose beliefs that were more in line with healthier functioning. 
As stated above, management of active symptoms during the prodrome would be crucial 
in a cognitive paradigm.  
 In many cognitively oriented treatments, the clients’ explanatory model for their 
own problems or difficulties is explored (Jackson, McGorry, & Edwards, 2001). In 
cognitive therapy, this serves to build the therapeutic alliance and collaborative approach. 
Beyond this, from a dialogic perspective, conceptualizing a person’s own internal 
representation of the problem allows for the patient’s voice to be heard and to be truly 
accepted as one possible explanation for ongoing difficulty. The ultimate goal of 
cognitive therapy is to redress or challenge maladaptive core beliefs and cognitive 
distortions (Clark, 2009). From a dialogic perspective, this can pose a problem, as it 
directly challenges the principle of tolerating uncertainty. As we know from dialogism 
and the Open Dialogue approach, diagnosing or coming to rapid clinical conclusions is 
something that OD attempts to avoid. In CT, labeling one set of cognitions as 
“maladaptive” and another “adaptive” and favoring the more adaptive set is an example 
of striving for certainty.  Diaologism would also critique the goal of redressing 
“maladaptive” core beliefs and cognitions during the prodrome, as this task would be 
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incredibly challenging when an altered internal dialogue and diminished sense of self are 
present for the client. Further, such redressing or cognitive “restructuring” requires the 
capacity to reflect on one’s own thinking and self-experience. This capacity, often known 
as metacognition, is often greatly impaired during psychosis and in the presence of the 
prodrome (Lysacker, Glynn, Wilkniss, & Silverstein, 2010). CT does implore that 
building engagement and the therapeutic alliance is crucial to providing safety in order to 
challenge these beliefs. However, the very notion that one person has the authority or 
power to privilege thoughts as more adaptive is problematic from a postmodern position. 
Cognitive restructuring, utilized during cognitively oriented therapy, including Cognitive 
Behavioral Therapy, is also problematic because it does not address the underlying 
problems related to diminished capacity for meta-cognition and self-experience.  
Commonalities Between Dialogism and Cognitive theory   
 Cognitive theory and dialogism have several commonalities, despite their 
divergent origins. These commonalities include the fundamental understanding that 
psychotic-like experience is more typical among the general population than commonly 
asserted. Further, both theories assert that disturbance of the sense of self is a primary 
feature of the prodromal phase.  Neither theory attempts to fully explain the cause or 
fundamental origin of psychosis or its prodrome, but rather explains the way psychotic-
like experience comes about, can be adaptive, what vulnerabilities might be present in 
prodromal individuals and the ways that these vulnerabilities are manifest in situations 
ripe for psychosis.  
  Cognitive theory helps us to understand some of the core vulnerabilities 
underlying the onset of the prodrome. In fact, cognitive theorists and dialogic theorists 
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assert that psychotic-like or frankly psychotic experiences are more common among the 
entire population than is generally acknowledged (Beck, 2004; Davidson, 2003; 
Morrison, 2008). However, most people have these experiences only rarely or under 
severe stress. Those vulnerable to psychosis or already in the prodromal phase have far 
more devastating and prolonged experiences that often lead to frank psychosis or 
schizophrenic illness (Beck, 2004) The cognitive structure in these individuals that is 
prone to core beliefs about the self such as “different, inept, inferior” (Beck, 2004). 
Dialogism furthers this conceptualization by acknowledging the different self-
experiences in the prodrome that correlate with these descriptions; monologic, barren or 
cacophonous. Symptoms associated with the prodromal phase are not unlike more 
common experiences, but only when these experiences become pervasive and intense, 
causing distress, changes in behavior and cause some decrease in “insight” is a diagnosis 
of psychosis made (Beck, 2004).  
 Both cognitive theory and dialogism cite disturbance of the sense of self as one of 
the most significant experiential difficulties for prodromal individuals (Lysacker & 
Lysacker, 2009; Nelson et al., 2007; Nelson & Yung, 2008;). As discussed earlier, there 
are three potential ways that self-experience can be disrupted, altered or diminished in the 
prodrome. These three ways include the barren, monologic and cacophonous self-
experiences. Dialogic theory does help us to conceive of many of the ways that self-
experience can be disrupted and how this manifests into prodromal presentations. 
However, dialogism does not explain the exact mechanism by which self-positions, 
dialogues and sense of self become hallucinations, delusions, negative symptoms and 
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social decline. Cognitive theory can work within the dialogic framework to explain in 
more detail how these self-experiences come about.  
 Frequently in cognitively oriented therapies, challenging distorted, maladaptive or 
unhealthy cognitions is part of the symptom management process. If a person has core 
beliefs that are negative or vulnerable, it is likely these beliefs are not verbalized and a 
great deal of shame is experienced when these beliefs are brought to light through 
behaviors or expression of language. During the process of cognitive behavioral therapy, 
inductive and Socratic questioning is used in a collaborative and safe manner as a way of 
peeling back the layers of information processing (Morrison, 2008). This is a way of 
giving voice and language to a previously silenced part of a person’s life, which mirrors 
the significance of a language-based intervention that is also relational and dialogic from 
dialogism. It is also done within the safety and containment of a relational dyad or group. 
One of the first principles of CBT in general and specifically for psychosis or first-
episode psychosis has been to establish therapeutic alliance (Jackson, McGorry, & 
Edwards, 2001).  This is also aligned with the dialogic idea of social network. In the 
Open Dialogue approach, the patient is invited to include their social network in the team 
meeting. The network can include family, friends, teachers, mentors and any other people 
that are significant in the person’s life. This is done as a way of visibly bringing the 
prodromal person’s interpersonal relationships to the forefront in order to address the 
disruption in interpersonal dialogue. As we know from dialogism, providing opportunity 
for interpersonal or external dialogue is a way of reawakening the person’s capacity for 
intrapersonal or internal dialogue.  
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 One of the other most salient common factors in dialogic and cognitive theories is 
that neither theory offers a comprehensive causal explanation for schizophrenia, 
psychosis or the prodrome. Instead, the theories each help us to conceive of what is 
occurring during psychotic or prodromal experiences. While cognitive theory is much 
more rooted in a biopsychosocial perspective, it does offer a refreshing conceptualization 
of psychotic symptoms. Instead of using the “diseased brain” explanatory model for 
understanding so-called incomprehensible psychotic symptom content, cognitive theory 
actually asserts that symptom content can be used to understand a person’s circumstances 
and cognitive vulnerabilities. Dialogic theory, firmly rooted in postmodern theory, asserts 
that psychotic symptoms are in fact a person’s attempt to make meaning out of intensely 
disturbing and disparate internal experiences. Both theories allow that psychotic-like 
experience is on the spectrum of reasonable expectable human responses under certain 
circumstances. The prodrome, therefore, both separate from frank psychosis and yet 
inexorably linked, also lies on this spectrum of experience.  
Understanding the Phenomena in a New Way 
  In this section I will use components of both theories to provide a synthesis of 
theoretical understanding. I will end the chapter with a re-assessment of the case material 
utilizing the synthesized theoretical framework.  
 The dominance of one or two self-positions can be known as a monological self. 
As we know, a dialogical self where continual dialogical process occurs inter- and intra-
personally. During the prodrome, the hierarchy of self-positions can become fixed in such 
a way that one or two self-positions become dominant. The resultant difficulty in the 
intrapersonal dialogical process is significant, as a prodromal person’s sense of self is 
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significantly diminished without prior experience modeling how to return to a full 
dialogical self.  Above, I stated that this could be associated with positive symptoms and 
emergent delusional thinking. A “monological” self, one dominated by one self-position 
correlates to the cognitive model of the process by which a person’s “inner voice” is 
externalized, creating auditory hallucinations (Beck, 2009). The inner voice of cognitive 
theory is actually a multiplicity of voices in healthy individuals. In prodromal individuals, 
a cognitive structure that favors externalizing adverse events and automatic thoughts that 
are indicative of vulnerable schemas can lead to the dominance of one or two self-
positions.  The self-positions are “louder” and can drown out the other self-positions.  In 
this way, self-positions are manifest from inner voices representative of a fixed dialogical 
process. These one or two voices are externalized outside agents through the process of 
automatic thought development.  As we know, many prodromal individuals begin to 
fixate on a few beliefs that have bizarre or delusional content. The above process can also 
help to explain how the preseverative thought and belief system begins to form in the 
prodrome.   
 Another possibility in the prodrome is that a caucophony of voices presents itself, 
whereby an individual feels overwhelmed by a flood of self-positions with no apparent 
organization (Lysacker & Lysacker, 2008). The lack of relationship between self-
positions signals a clear disruption of the intrapersonal dialogic, which leads to 
disturbance in interpersonal dialogue and the coherent sense of self. This disorganized 
presentation could manifest itself in loosening of associations, reports of voices or lack of 
coherence in language, as is frequently seen in the prodrome either as subclinical 
hallucinations and delusions, as well as disorganized thinking, difficulty in concentration 
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and social and functional decline. Cognitively, the prodromal person is unable to properly 
process information as it enters the person’s perception.  
 Yet another presentation in prodromal individuals appears to be what most 
clinicians would deem “negative” symptomatology. This is characterized by undeveloped 
or fragmented self-positions. In this case, an individuals’ dialogue with others is likely to 
be limited and discontinuous. James’ case is a good example of this kind of experience of 
self-diminishment based on disrupted dialogical processes. In cognitive theory, the 
“barren” or more silent presentation is in fact an active coping skill. The disengagement 
in communication and social skills is a way of managing intensely disturbing affect 
associated with such dialogue. We can conceive of the barren or empty self as correlated 
to negative symptomatology. The cognitive conception of the negative symptoms of the 
prodrome (i.e. social withdrawal, avoidance of social contact, avolition) are seen as active 
coping skills used to assist the individual in mitigating the disturbing content of his 
thoughts and the associated negative affect (Clark, 2009). The person also often searches 
for evidence to support the beliefs she has chosen to explain her unusual internal 
experiences. Rather than characterizing this as evidence of lack of insight, as is 
traditionally done with refractory delusions, it is much more helpful to see this as the 
person’s struggle for meaning.  
Application to Case of James 
 The case of James reveals what could be called negative symptomatology and a 
self-experience that appears to be barren or perhaps monological. When asked what 
brings him in for an evaluation, James states that he doesn’t know why he is there, which 
can lead us to assume that he has little awareness of the problems that have caused his 
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social network to have concern for him. He has retreated from his friends and other social 
activities, such as playing basketball. He shows little enjoyment or motivation in the 
activities he once engaged in. He has also begun to refuse to attend school. When he was 
attending school, he frequently lacked language to describe his thoughts, intentions, 
experiences and emotions. His self-narrative seems to certainly be impoverished, as he is 
unable to capture his experience in words. Rather, his inaction seems to speak louder than 
anything he has said.  
 We cannot know what James’ subjective self-experience is, as we have limited 
material from the case and his capacity for language seems to be disrupted. What little we 
do know, however, points to a diminished sense of self. He feels uncomfortable around 
others, unsure of himself and how to act. He gets the sense that people are looking at him 
menacingly, he is not sure if he should make eye contact with others.  He also has the 
sense that he is having déjà vu with relative frequency. All of these experiences could 
signal either a diminishment of available self-positions, as in barren sense of self, or the 
dominance of one or two fixed self-positions, as in monological self-experience. For 
example, James states that he finds New York dirtier and noisier after returning from 
South Carolina. This may signal a difficulty in James’ ability to shift to and from the self-
position of self-as New Yorker to self-as visiting other places, for instance. He becomes 
fixed that something is no longer the same in New York and has difficulty re-entering his 
self-position in this context.  
 One of the characteristic images of the prodrome is captured in the case of James; 
James sitting by himself, silent and unable to describe what is happening to him when he 
is discovered by the janitor at his school. This occurs after James has isolated himself 
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from his friends and family and lost interest in many of the activities he once enjoyed. 
Even more striking, James is literally at a loss for words when asked to write an essay in 
class. Upon hearing this passage, one is at once stuck by the silence and inability to act 
that James is struggling with. Within this very imagery, we can find core components of 
dialogic theory; the lack of language, interpersonal and intrapersonal dialogue, loss of 
agency and diminished sense of himself. 
 From cognitive theory, we can see that James has perhaps an underlying 
externalizing bias, as evidenced by his increased thoughts about politics, blaming George 
Bush for 9/11 and fantasizing about violence, and feeling that society was controlled by 
TV and mass media, all coinciding with his diminished self-experience and experience of 
himself as different, uncomfortable and unable to act in appropriate ways. Many of his 
thoughts are common and contextually quite typical as a black, teenage male living in 
New York City.  However, he appears to have a proclivity to locate his difficulties 
outside of himself, which can lead to automatic thoughts that are externalized, negative 
and indicate underlying schemata and core beliefs based on vulnerability towards 
psychotic-like thinking.  
 Based on the research suggesting three prodromal syndromes, as stated in other 
chapters in this thesis, James could meet the criteria for the prodrome. Based on the 
Genetic Risk and Deterioration syndrome (GRD), (assuming that James’ mother’s 
psychotic-like experience does indeed qualify for genetic risk), James does in fact show 
significant signs of social and role functioning decline. It is also possible to argue that he 
is experiencing attenuated psychotic symptoms (hearing his name whispered, seeing the 
dark shadow, feelings of paranoia, etcetera), which are captured by the Attenuated 
 120
Positive Symptoms syndrome (APS). One of the challenges to using an objectified 
instrument to account for prodromal risk is that, as in the case of James, the symptoms 
are frequently difficult to categorized and objectify. There are several examples of this 
within the case material: the questions of James’ mother’s “psychotic break” accounting 
for genetic risk, cultural and race factors including James’ experience of paranoia as a 
young black male in his neighborhood, and other vague but unusual perceptual and 
sensory abnormalities. 
 Coupled with these underlying vulnerabilities and his limited sense of himself, 
James is already exhibiting signs of negative or diminished self-experience. Given the 
above criteria signaling a vague risk, evidence of a negative symptom picture and from 
our new understanding of the prodrome based on both cognitive and dialogic theory, it is 
certain that James is at high risk for psychotic experience. We know from this new 
understanding that negative symptoms often indicate an active attempt to cope with an 
altered sense of self. We can also extrapolate that James’ extreme withdrawal and lack of 
language signals limited options for self-positions and a lack of language for describing 
his experience. We know from his mental status exam that he was able to describe a 
limited self-experience in the last few months. His initial reaction to why he was 
evaluated, however, is indicative of severely limited language-based communications of 
what is troubling him.  
Limitations  
 There are certainly limitations to these theoretical conceptualizations. One 
question that may arise is related to the notion that psychosis may arise as a result of 
chemical imbalances in the brain or structural brain abnormalities. Both theories do allow 
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for the possibility that brain dysfunction or abnormality could be the cause of psychosis 
and its prodrome. Cognitive theory, for instance, would respond that the conflation of 
biological, neurological, psychological and social factors combine to contribute to 
vulnerability and onset of psychotic illness.  This thesis has explored psychotic illness 
that is not related to medical illness, substance abuse, or severe affective or mood 
disorders.  In the absence of these conditions, there are still aspects of psychotic illness 
that appear to be left unexplained by cognitive theory. The theory rests on the principle 
that human suffering related to psychopathology has psychological underpinnings related 
to information processing. Many human experiences are outside the cognitive realm and 
involve physiological and special sensations, affect, emotion and meaning making, 
among many other things. Cognitive theory heavily rests on reflection on thinking, 
cognition and intellectualization of human experience, which does preclude many other 
ways of experiencing and understanding the world.  
 Cognitive theory allows for any number of conditions to interact and explain the 
etiology of psychotic illness. This leaves us with innumerable factors combining in 
causation of psychosis. While the significance of cognitive theory’s contribution is 
notable in understanding how psychotic thinking can be understood and addressed, it still 
leaves many unanswered questions about how to more narrowly conceptualize biological, 
genetic, neurological and developmental causes.  
 Dialogism, on the other hand, makes no claims at definitive etiological theory of 
prodromal syndromes. Postmodern theories, dialogism included, would state that 
psychotic symptoms are not actually symptoms of an underlying disease, but rather are a 
response to circumstances in which prodromal symptoms make sense. These “symptoms” 
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are an indication of the prodromal person’s response to their altered sense of self. 
However, we do not receive clear information about where self-disturbance originates 
and how it comes about.  
 This thesis is limited to the two theoretical frameworks I have chosen to explore. 
The choice of these theories and my way of exploring and synthesizing them reveals my 
own theoretical and practical biases and is one way of conceptualizing the clinical 
phenomena of the prodrome.  
Treatment and Practice Implications 
 The primary goal of treatment would be to assist James in moving from the 
collapse of internal and external dialogue towards improved capacity for such dialogue. 
Because James appears to be suffering with barren self-dialogue, it can also appear that in 
the diminishment of self-experience, self-positions have been lost of eliminated during 
the prodromal period. It could be assumed that the mechanisms of distorted cognitions 
and diminished dialogical processes means that cognitive ability and dialogical capacity 
have been lost, but this is actually not the case. As we know from research on self-
disturbance and neurocognition, these vulnerabilities are often present in pre-morbid 
period and often onset more fully during the prodrome. Cognitive and dialogical capacity 
can be built during therapeutic interventions that include relational dialogue, promotion 
of internal dialogue, awareness of the role of automatic thoughts and cognitive thoughts 
in relapsing prodromal symptoms.  
 Psychotherapy is at its core a relational dialogue, involving an interpersonal 
dialogue between the therapist and the client. If self-experience is disrupted in its 
capacity for dialogue by the prodromal experiences, then providing access to increased 
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dialogue is a viable foundation for beginning treatment. Access to latent self-positions 
must also be addressed. There is evidence to suggest that initiating external interpersonal 
dialogue can assist in re-establishing intrapersonal internal dialogue (Lysacker & 
Lysacker, 2002). James’ limited available self-positions could be rebuilt with the support 
of a therapist, with the therapist serving to assist in challenging automatic thoughts that 
can limit James’ access. Tolerating uncertainty will be a crucial aspect of treatment, 
which can be somewhat hard to reconcile with cognitive behavioral work. It will be 
important for the therapist to not create a new self-narrative, new self-positions or initiate 
self-experience for James, but rather to use the therapeutic alliance to identify agreed 
upon cognitive distortions and automatic thoughts that are preventing the full range of 
self-experience.  
 It is also important to include the social network in James’ treatment as a way of 
continued interpersonal external dialogue. This will also make it possible for the family 
to access language for what was previously difficult or impossible to describe. This can 
serve as a model for James’ own internal dialogue. It can also serve to rebuild 
interpersonal connections that represent existent but silenced self-positions, such as self-
as-son, self-as-brother, self-as-part of family, self-as Black or African American, etcetera. 
Returning to self-positions that have lain dormant can help to enrich the self-narrative 
and lessen feelings of paranoia, discomfort and limited sense of self that accompany 
negative externalized thoughts.  
Conclusion 
 It is clear that the suffering and mental anguish experienced during the prodromal 
phase of psychosis warrants clinical attention. From this current study, we can conclude 
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that self-disturbance present during the prodromal phase and perhaps prior to the 
prodrome is quite likely to be one of the defining features of psychotic illness. Both 
cognitive theory and dialogic theory help us to see how underlying vulnerabilities 
conflate to create a diminished self-experience for individuals at high risk for 
schizophrenic illness. In turn, this disturbance of sense of self may be the crucial risk 
factor or indicator of psychotic experience. The two theories allow us to see the 
mechanism by which self-experience is altered in prodromal syndromes. This alteration 
lays the groundwork for the entrenchment of psychotic illness. Cognitive theory and 
dialogic theory, taken together, can offer many practical clinical interventions that 
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